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EVALUATING ORIGINALISM:
COMMERCE AND EMOLUMENTS
JOHN VLAHOPLUS†
INTRODUCTION
The debates among originalists and between them and their
critics have continued unabated since Paul Brest, H. Jefferson
Powell, and others rebutted original intent originalism in
the 1980s.1 Critics claim victory, arguing that none of the many
originalist theories is conceptually sound,2 normatively
attractive,3 consistent with the others,4 or accurate as a
description of American constitutional practice.5 Originalism is
merely “a collection of rapidly evolving theories, constantly
reshaping themselves in profound ways in response to devastating
critiques, and not infrequently splintering further into multiple,
mutually exclusive iterations. . . . The very notion of originalism
itself has become indeterminate.”6
Originalism is not a
jurisprudential doctrine, but rather a political practice designed to
achieve specific ends through the dubious claim that its historical
authenticity transcends political disputes.7 Originalists respond

†
B.A., Washington & Lee University; J.D., Harvard Law School; D.Phil., Oxford
University; Member, New York State Bar. Thanks to Gary Lawson, Robert G.
Natelson, Lawrence B. Solum, Seth Barrett Tillman, Phoebe Vlahoplus, and the
editors of the St. John’s Law Review.
1
See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L. J.
239, 243–44 (2009) (ongoing debates among originalists and between them and
critics); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.
L. REV. 204, 205 (1980); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original
Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 885 (1985).
2
See, e.g., Colby & Smith, supra note 1, at 244.
3
See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 2 (asserting that “[t]extualism is . . . normatively unattractive” if it asserts
real differences from purposivism).
4
See, e.g., Colby & Smith, supra note 1, at 245–46.
5
See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185,
1195 (2008); Brest, supra note 1, at 231–32; Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 34, 36 (2009).
6
Colby & Smith, supra note 1, at 245–46.
7
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s
Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 561 (2006).
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that competing pluralist theories are indeterminate, arbitrary,
unattractive, and mutually inconsistent.8 They claim victory
despite the force of critical attacks, arguing that originalism
prevails in practice even though no one has written “a definitive
formulation of originalism or a definitive refutation of its critics.”9
Other scholars argue that the contestants are merely “talking
past one another,”10 emphasizing minor points of difference at the
expense of general agreement on fundamental issues.11 They
conclude that we have reached a “strong consensus on the
interpretive enterprise” and should now “engage in a more
productive dialogue regarding the narrow differences that
remain.”12
This Article suggests that originalist theories share a core
focus that meaningfully competes with pluralist theories. The
contest is real and appears in centuries of debates within
Anglo-American and civil law.
The Article locates the
Anglo-American
origins
of
originalism
in
a
novel
seventeenth-century method of legal interpretation used to
achieve a specific political end: to stifle opposition to the union of
Scottish and English subjects of King James after his accession to
the English crown in 1603. It details the novel method and the
competing traditional method of English legal interpretation. It
then evaluates originalist interpretations of the Commerce and
Emoluments Clauses of the Constitution in light of the two
competing methods.

8

See, e.g., Christopher R. Green, “This Constitution”: Constitutional Indexicals as
a Basis for Textualist Semi-Originalism, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1607, 1617 n.21
(2009) (criticizing theories that utilize multiple modes of constitutional discourse as
indeterminate or ultimately reliant on the supremacy of the interpreter rather than
the Constitution); Colby & Smith, supra note 1, at 241 (Justice Scalia: critics cannot
agree on anything except that originalism is wrong); Randy E. Barnett, An
Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 617 (1999) (“It takes a theory to
beat a theory,” and critics of originalism have not agreed on “an appealing and
practical alternative”).
9
Barnett, supra note 8, at 613.
10
See Molot, supra note 3, at 2; cf. Berman, supra note 5, at 4 (questioning
whether “self-professed originalists champion a version of originalism that their
critics don’t reject, and that the critics challenge a version the proponents don’t
maintain,” but concluding that originalist efforts have failed and have slim prospects
for future success).
11
See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical
Fact in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 9 (2015) (noting widespread
agreement on ecumenical originalism).
12
See Molot, supra note 3, at 2.
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Part I provides a brief introduction to the core of originalism
and its criticisms of pluralism. Part II sets out the novel
seventeenth-century method of interpretation. Part III details the
traditional pluralist method of English legal interpretation and its
critique of the novel theory. Part IV suggests that the competing
English approaches anticipated many of the major points that
originalists and their critics debate today. Part V evaluates
originalist interpretations of the Commerce Clause. Part VI
evaluates originalist interpretations of the Emoluments Clauses
in the context of President Trump’s business activities, with
special attention to Anglo-American legal history proximate to the
adoption of the Constitution that characterized the benefits of
government contracts as emoluments that threaten public trust
and the survival of representative government. Part VII considers
the implications of the evaluations for originalism.
This Article concludes that the core of originalism is
normative, not descriptive. It continues to face the same
challenges that it has throughout history. It has survived for
centuries because it is normative, and its proponents are unlikely
to yield to theoretical arguments any time soon.
I.

ORIGINALISM: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION

“Originalism” is a family of interpretive theories that
generally share two features: an acute focus on history and an
aversion to allowing judges the discretion to apply personal or
contemporary values when interpreting constitutional text.13
13

For a summary of the literature on point, see Colby & Smith, supra note 1, at
288 n.225. See also Solum, supra note 11, at 6–8 (describing originalism as a family of
theories, most of which consider legal facts to constrain adjudication); id. at 59
(asserting that even if constitutional terms like “equal” have essential moral
meanings, some originalists would oppose interpreting them as such); Stephen E.
Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 845
(2015) (“Originalism starts by assigning the legal system an origin, namely the
Founding. That means it accepts the law as it stood at the Founding, regardless of
how it got that way.”); Colby & Smith, supra note 1, at 243, 279; Barnett, supra
note 8, at 636, 641–42; Green, supra note 8, at 1624, 1658, 1662; Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. 857, 859 (2009) (“[A]nachronistic readings would decisively undermine the
Constitution as a written, authoritative, binding, and exclusive document.”); id. at
878–79 (attacking the technique of identifying an abstract principle in the
Constitution, assigning it a specific content based on the interpreter’s own
discernment, then infusing that content into particular constitutional provisions);
Matthew J. Franck, Re: Anti-Federalist Society, NAT’L REV. (Aug. 8, 2005, 3:43 PM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/re-anti-federalist-society-matthew-jfranck/ (noting that Federalist Society members are “united by little else than a
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Originalists use a variety of techniques to tie constitutional
interpretation to the past, including textualism,14 strict
construction,15 rules of grammar,16 dictionary definitions17 and
etymologies18 recorded proximate to adoption, and the publicly
expressed intent of the drafters or ratifiers.19 In particular, many
originalists argue that the writtenness of constitutional text
necessarily ties its interpretation to history.20
There are many varieties of originalist theories.21 Two broad
types are conceptual and communicative. Conceptual originalism
asserts that legal interpretation consists by definition of
determining the historical meaning of legal texts. Judges cannot
use discretion to apply personal or contemporary values when
interpreting legal text because that simply is not
“interpretation.”22 Communicative originalism asserts that legal
text is a communication from an author in the past to the current

rejection of the doctrine of the ‘living Constitution’ ”). Despite some retreat on the goal
of restraining judges, the core originalist approach still seeks that effect, for example
by insisting that the original meaning is and must be locked in at enactment. See, e.g.,
Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
101, 106 (2001).
14
See, e.g., Green, supra note 8, at 1612.
15
See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 386 (2013) (in the 1970s and 1980s).
16
See, e.g., Solum, supra note 11, at 23.
17
See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 8, at 621.
18
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 586 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring), quoted in Barnett, supra note 13, at 101 n.4 and accompanying text.
19
See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 15, at 378.
20
See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 8, at 634 (“Adopting any meaning contrary to the
original meaning would be to contradict or change the meaning of the text . . . and
thereby to undermine the value of writtenness.”); id. at 635 (“[A] proper respect for
the writtenness of the text means that those committed to this Constitution have no
choice but to respect the original meaning of its text . . . .”); Paulsen, supra note 13, at
882 (“[T]he specification of the text excludes subjective . . . personal interpretation; it
excludes anachronistic readings of the meanings of its words . . . .”).
21
See, e.g., Berman, supra note 5, at 14 (describing seventy-two distinct varieties).
22
See, e.g., Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.
J. 1823, 1834 (1997) (“As . . . addressed to an external audience, the Constitution’s
meaning is its original public meaning. Other approaches to interpretation are simply
wrong.”); Paulsen, supra note 13, at 863. Conceptual originalism does not necessarily
assert that it imposes any normative constraints on judicial discretion. See, e.g.,
Lawson, supra, at 1823–25; Gary Lawson, Originalism Without Obligation, 93 B.U. L.
REV. 1309, 1313 (2013) (defining originalism as strictly “a theory of
meaning . . . evaluated by reference to positive criteria of accuracy in discerning
communicative signals”).
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reader.23 Interpretation consists of, and only of, determining the
meaning—that is, the communicative content—of the written
text.24 Depending on the particular theory, the Constitution’s
author might be the Founders,25 the framers,26 the drafters,27 the
ratifiers, 28 or the general public: “We the People of the United
States.”29
Also, depending on the particular theory, the
communication might consist of the intent of the author, the public
meaning of the words that the author chose, or both reflexively, as
“the content the author intended to convey to the reader via the
audience’s recognition of the author’s communicative intention.”30
Communicative originalism asserts that this meaning is an
objective social fact discoverable by empirical investigation31—a
fact about the world that does not depend on the interpreter’s own
norms or values.32 This factual meaning has binding normative
force that flows from the justification of the particular originalist

23

See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269,
272 (2017) (“The authors of a constitutional text are attempting to communicate some
content to future readers.”).
24
See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 15, at 389 (“The originalist project is
committed to uncovering, to the degree possible, the meaning of the rule or principle
that those who were authorized to create the Constitution meant to communicate, not
to making use of any particular form of constitutional argument.”).
25
See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 7, at 548 n.15.
26
Colby & Smith, supra note 1, at 249–50.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23
CONST. COMMENT. 47, 49 (2006) (citing U.S. CONST. pmbl.).
30
Solum, supra note 23, at 277 (footnote omitted) (emphasis omitted). Gathering
these diverse communicative theories into one follows Solum’s approach of
“[e]cumenical originalism” in lieu of “[s]ectarian originalism” that focuses on the
differences among rival theories. See Solum, supra note 11, at 9.
31
See James C Phillips, Daniel M. Ortner, & Thomas R. Lee, Corpus Linguistics
& Original Public Meaning: A New Tool to Make Originalism More Empirical, 126
YALE L.J.F. 21, 22 (May 16, 2016).
32
See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 8, at 621 (“objective approach” to find the “original
‘objective’ meaning”); Griffin, supra note 5, at 1189 (new originalism emphasizes
objective version of intent); Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction
Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 99 (2010) (“[T]he linguistic meaning of a text is
a fact about the world.”). More recent versions of originalism also claim to find law as
an objective fact. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original
Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against
Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 763 (2009) (“original methods as a necessary
means to determine objective meaning”); Sachs, supra note 13, at 833 (“[I]t’s still
possible that social facts ultimately provide the answer, and that this answer supports
the originalist view.”).
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theory, such as popular sovereignty,33 the rule of law,34 or consent
of the governed.35 For example, Randy E. Barnett explains that
only “adhering [to] the original meaning of the text” can “provide
security for a consistent, stable and faithful exercise of the
Constitution’s powers.”36
II. ANGLO-AMERICAN ORIGINS: THE CASE OF THE POST-NATI
The core of originalism appears in Anglo-American
jurisprudence as early as the seventeenth century in debates over
the status of Scots in England after the union of the crowns of the
two kingdoms. In 1603, the English crown descended to James VI
of Scotland upon the death of Elizabeth without issue. James
styled himself King of Great Britain37 and sought to merge
England and Scotland into one kingdom.38
The English
parliament refused.39 He then sought to unify all people born in
either kingdom after the descent (the post-nati), but the English
parliament again refused.40 Proponents of James’s position argued
that subjects owed allegiance to the king in his natural body, so
that no one born in either kingdom after the descent could be an
alien in the other.41 Opponents argued that subjects owed
allegiance to the king in his politic body, so that post-nati Scots
were natural-born subjects of James VI of Scotland but aliens in
James I’s England.42 James’s interpretation could not be correct
because, among other reasons, it would necessarily apply to any
dominions the king might acquire by descent throughout the
world, even though their peoples might be more estranged from

33

See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 8, at 613 n.9.
See, e.g., James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New
Textualism, 97 VA. L. REV. 1523, 1532 (2011).
35
Colby & Smith, supra note 1, at 275.
36
Barnett, supra note 8, at 629.
37
JOHN SPOTSWOOD, THE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND 486 (London,
R. Norton ed. 1668).
38
Id. at 480.
39
Id.
40
7 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 639 (London, James Spedding et al.,
eds. 1859) (preface) (House of Commons refused).
41
See, e.g., Case of the Union of the Realm of Scotland with England (1608), 2
How. St. Tr. 559, 570–71 (Lord Coke: allegiance is tied to the king’s body natural, not
body politic, so the post-nati “are not born out of the kings allegiance, and so not aliens,
but subjects”); id. at 566 (Earl of Northampton on the harmony of the subjects like the
parts of the “body natural” under the body’s head).
42
Id. at 566–68.
34
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the English than were Scots.43 Further, it would allow post-nati
Scots to overrun England, consume its wealth, and disrupt its
political system;44 and it would unify post-nati of the different
dominions by shared perpetual natural allegiance even though a
subsequent descent could easily separate those dominions.45
James then arranged the filing of companion cases46 in 1608
in the Court of King’s Bench (Calvin v. Smith)47 and the Court of
Chancery (Calvin v. Bingley)48 seeking judicial determinations of
the common law. The cases were argued together and came to be
known as the Case of the Post-Nati, or Calvin’s Case.49
Many of those who propounded James’s position in
Parliament and in court relied on a radical new way to interpret
English law. In an apparent attempt to stifle any further political
dispute over the status of post-nati Scots, they asserted that
opposing arguments were merely political, not legal;50 that the law
precludes judicial discretion and requires specific decisions even if
they yield bad results in hard cases;51 and that any remedy for
hard results lies with subsequent legislation.52 As one argued in
language familiar to originalists:
The judgments so even and so impartial, as they give way to no
mans affection, nor impute blame to any man; but to say the law
requireth such judgment, is an excuse satisfactory to all men, for

43

See, e.g., Case of the Post-Nati of Scotland, in 15 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS
BACON 189, 218 (James Spedding et al., eds. 1864).
44
See id.; Case of the Union of the Realm of Scotland with England (1608), 2 How.
St. Tr. at 564 (Sir Edwyn Sandes).
45
See Case of the Post-Nati, supra note 43, at 222–23.
46
Id.
47
Calvin v. Smith (1608), 2 How. St. Tr. 607, 607 (Lord Coke, identifying
defendants as Richard and Nicholas Smith). The State Trials report, while not a
standard citation for law reviews, provides the complete set of materials from
Parliament, the King’s Bench Case, and the Chancery case. An alternative citation to
the English Reports is: Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B. 1608).
48
This case is not generally cited in standard form. The defendants in the case
were John Bingley and Richard Griffin. See Lord Ellesmere, Lord Chancellor
Ellesmere’s Speech in the Exchequer Chamber, in the Case of the Postnati (1608),
2 How. St. Tr. 659, 661 (opinion of Lord Ellesmere in the Chancery case).
49
See, e.g., 5 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 106 (Basil Montagu ed. 1826); Polly
J. Price, Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin’s Case (1608), 9 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 73, 81–82 (1997).
50
Francis Bacon, Speech of Lord Bacon, as Counsel for Calvin, in the Exchequer
Chamber (1608), 2 How. St. Tr. at 590.
51
Case of the Union of the Realm of Scotland with England (1608), 2 How. St. Tr.
at 569 (Popham, C.J.).
52
Bacon, supra note 50, at 590.
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the king, and the judges. . . . [I]t were better to live under a
certain known law, though hard sometimes in a few cases, then
to be subject to the alterable discretion of any judges.53

Lord Coke asserted in his report of the decision in Calvin v. Smith
that “no man ought to take upon him to be wiser than the laws . . . ;
neither have judges power to judge according to that which they
think to be fit, but that which out of the laws they know to be right
and consonant to law.”54 Lord Bacon argued as counsel for Calvin
that “[f]or us to speak of the mischiefs, I hold it not fit for this
place, lest we should seem to bend the laws to policy, and not take
them in their true and natural sense.”55 Only the strict application
of certain known law prevents “the rule of justice, by which the
people are governed,” from being too pliable, weak, and
uncertain.56
To determine the common law on point, these proponents
looked to English history under a succession of rulers from the
Romans through King Edgar, King Ethelredus, the Normans,
West Saxons, and others.57 They examined in great detail the
definition of “ligeance” and of its subdivisions,58 the definitions of
“[a]lienigena” and its subdivisions,59 and “de legibus” and the
several types of law.60 They relied on the etymologies of words in
legal usage such as “denizen.”61 They parsed legal texts by clause
and word.62 They asserted that no foreign law was necessary or
applicable because the laws of England are copious enough to
determine cases and because arguments from foreign law would
be “foreign, strange, and an alien to the state of the question,

53
Case of the Union of the Realm of Scotland with England (1608), 2 How. St. Tr.
at 569 (Popham, C.J.).
54
Calvin v. Smith (1608), 2 How. St. Tr. at 612, 656 (Lord Coke).
55
Bacon, supra note 50, at 606; see also Case of the Union of the Realm of Scotland
with England (1608), 2 How. St. Tr. at 566 (Earl of Northampton: “Nor . . . can we be
measured or guided by inconveniences that may be forecast; because we are confined
to a point of law already received and planted, and are to reason and discuss what
that law is.”).
56
Ellesmere, supra note 48, at 677 (summarizing the view, with which he
disagreed).
57
Case of the Union of the Realm of Scotland with England (1608), 2 How. St. Tr.
at 569 (Popham, C.J.); Calvin, 2 How. St. Tr. at 643–45, 646, 650 (Lord Coke).
58
Calvin, 2 How. St. Tr. at 613 et seq. (Lord Coke).
59
Id. at 636 et seq.
60
Id. at 629 et seq.
61
Id. at 639.
62
Id. at 618 (breaking down the oath of ligeance into five clauses and examining
the specific words in each).
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which . . . is only to be decided by the laws of this realm.”63 They
concluded that the common law “had continued as a rock without
alteration in all the varieties of people that had possessed this
land”64 and prescribed that the post-nati were natural born
subjects in both kingdoms, not aliens.65 In particular, Coke
insisted that his judgment for Calvin was not an innovation, but
merely a “renovation” of earlier decisions.66
Lord Bacon took an approach similar to many originalists. He
argued that laws should be understood in their natural sense,67
and that critical words in several specifically relevant statutes
should be interpreted according to their common understanding or
as mere tropes of speech.68 He argued that the outcome of the case
required nothing more than common knowledge: “It is enough
that every man knows, that it is true of these two kingdoms, which
a good father said of the churches of Christ: ‘si inseparabiles
insuperabiles.’ ”69
The repudiation of judicial discretion and consequentialist
analysis is notable. English judges had long exercised both when
interpreting common and written law70 and would continue to do
so after Calvin’s Case.71 Rejection of interpretive discretion and
reliance on scripture only—“sola Scriptura”—was a dominant
doctrine of English Protestant theology.72 A 1619 sermon, for
example, dismissed traditional judicial interpretive techniques of
responsa prudentum, or the opinions of the wise,73 and arbitria
judicum, or judicial decisions, as inappropriate for interpreting
scripture because:

63

Id. at 612.
Case of the Union of the Realm of Scotland with England (1608), 2 How. St. Tr.
at 569 (Popham, C.J.).
65
Calvin, 2 How. St. Tr. at 656 (Lord Coke).
66
Id.
67
Bacon, supra note 50, at 606.
68
Id. at 585–86.
69
Id. at 606.
70
See, e.g., Ellesmere, supra note 48, at 674–76.
71
See, e.g., Leslies v. Grant (1763), 2 Pat. 68, 77 (interpreting a derivative
nationality statute narrowly, in part because a broader reading “would let in all
sorts of persons into the family rights, Jews, French, &c., without any test or
qualification—without any residence” with the result “in terror” that the law “might
naturalize one-half of Europe”).
72
See, e.g., Powell, supra note 1, at 889.
73
See, e.g., SAMUEL WARREN, SELECT EXTRACTS FROM BLACKSTONE’S
COMMENTARIES, CAREFULLY ADAPTED TO THE USE OF SCHOOLS AND YOUNG PERSONS
36 (London, 1837) (“responsa prudentum, or opinions of learned lawyers”).
64
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[T]hese rules may be bent, and are bent oftentimes to serve the
wills and pleasures of men. But we must have such a rule as may
be without all exception and variation: a rule that must be, as
some learned speak in the terms of the Schools, inobliquabilis &
indeviabilis: a rule that no good man dare, nor no wicked man
can bend to his private affection.74

Martin Luther propounded this religious doctrine, which
relies on the individual’s reading of scripture unmediated by the
interpretations of ecclesiastical authorities.75
The claim that deciding cases according to certain, known
laws is an excuse satisfactory to all—including judges and the
king—is also notable. The word “excuse” had several uses at the
time. One was “[a] plea for release from a duty, obligation, etc.”76
In this sense the novel theory operates to release the judge from
any obligation to exercise discretion or to consider values when
deciding cases. The law simply is what it is. Another use was “[a]
plea in extenuation of an offence.”77 In this sense, the claim that
the law simply is the law provides an apology or extenuation of the
offense of enforcing bad results in hard cases. If the law provides
that anyone born in any of the king’s dominions is natural born in
all of them, and if this creates bad results, that simply is the law;
there is no blame for James or the judges. As Lord Bacon argued
in the case, if the result is bad, then the solution is simple:
Parliament can enact a statute to change the law.78 Another use,
less flattering to the novelists, was “a (mere) pretext, a
subterfuge.”79
III. THE TRADITIONAL PLURALIST METHOD OF ENGLISH LEGAL
INTERPRETATION
Lord Ellesmere reached the same substantive result in his
decision in Smith v. Bingley, but severely criticized the new
interpretive approach, calling its proponents “nouelists”80
[novelists] for having invented it and “busie questionists” for
having questioned the traditional English method of legal
74

HUMPH. MUNNING, A PIOUS SERMON, PREACHED BY THAT LATE PAINFULL AND
PROFITABLE MINISTER OF GODS WORD 10 (Cambridge, 1641).
75
ROLAND H. BAINTON, HERE I STAND: A LIFE OF MARTIN LUTHER 117 (1950).
76
Excuse, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY def. 2.b (2018), https://www.oed.com/
view/Entry/65968?rskey=jyW1GG&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid.
77
Id. at def. 2.a.
78
Bacon, supra note 50, at 590.
79
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 76, at def. 2.
80
Ellesmere, supra note 48, at 677.
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interpretation.81 He criticized arguments from history, definition,
etymology, religious theory, and pliability. He then described and
defended the traditional, pluralist method of English legal
interpretation.
Historical interpretation, he explained, “is alwaies darke,
obscure, and vncerten, of what kingdome, countrey, or place
soeuer,”82 agreeing with Livy that “many times errors are involved
in things of such an old age”83 and citing Saint Augustine that the
supposed books of Enoch “are scorned because of their great
antiquity.”84
He noted that other judges used as many definitional and
etymological interpretations “as wit and art could deuise,”85
alleging “manie definitions, descriptions, distinctions, differences,
diuisions, subdiuisions, allusion of wordes, extension of wordes,
construction of wordes; and nothing left vnsearched to finde” the
meanings of “ligeantia,” “allegiantia,” “indigenæ,” “alienigenæ,”
and other like words.86 Ellesmere declined to rely on definitions
for legal interpretation. He explained that definition is two-fold:
first, the identification of genus and difference; and second, the
description or designation of things.87 As a result, “definition and
description are often confounded.”88 Yet he did not privilege
definition proper over definition by description. He considered
both to be “vncerten and dangerous,”89 agreeing with Ulpian

81

Id. at 694; cf. id. at 669, 671 (“questionists”).
Id. at 678 (excepting only “the diuine histories written in the bible”).
83
Id. (as translated from “in tanta rerum vetustate multi temporis errores
implicantur”).
84
Id. (as translated from “libri isti ob nimiam antiquitatem reijciuntur”).
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. (as translated from “definitio est duplex: propria, quæ constat ex genere, et
differentia: impropria, quæ et descriptio vocatur, et est quælibet rei designatio”
(original citation omitted)).
88
Id. at 678–79.
89
Id. at 679; cf. IAN MACLEAN, INTERPRETATION AND MEANING IN THE
RENAISSANCE: THE CASE OF LAW 109 (1992) (Renaissance view that definition is
“dangerous: it is suitable for philosophers, but not for jurists,” because “lawyers need
rules of thumb” and so “[a]ll definitions in law are normative”). This is not a fault of
the law; indeed, “it is the distinguishing feature of the law to give form to future
transactions . . . which are . . . indefinite; thus it is not a bad thing, if all cases are not
covered by the law; indeed this is an impossible aim, given the fragility of human
intellect.” MACLEAN, supra, at 109 & n.82 (quoting and translating Cagnoli in
Commentarii ad Titulum Digest. de Regulis Iuris Antiqui 783 (Lugduni, 1593),
https://books.google.com/books?id=gWxFAAAAcAAJ).
82
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that “every definition in civil law is dangerous.”90 Ellesmere
dismissed “the many and diuerse distinctions, diuisions, and
subdiuisions . . . made in [the] case” because “anything cut in the
dust is admixed”91 and because “a man may wander and misse his
way in mists of distinctions.”92
Ellesmere ridiculed etymological interpretation, calling it
“light and deceptive and generally comical”93 and “a pedant
grammarians fault,”94 noting that “if you examine the examples
which some doe bring, you will perceiue how ridiculous and vaine
it is.”95 Worse, he asserted that etymologies are traps for the
unwary, agreeing with another that they are “word nooses and
syllable snares.”96 Ellesmere may have referred to the twelfth
century bishop and philosopher John of Salisbury, who:
In a witty little passage at the expense of lawyers . . . comments
on their ability to ensnare the unwary in nooses of words and
syllables. He declares that simple-minded folk are lost if they
learn not this art of ‘syllabizing.’ . . . [He] enriched Mediaeval
Latin with a new word, a little arrow of sarcasm for the target of
the Law: ‘to syllabize.’97

Etymologies tie words to the past at the expense of evolving
usage, and so Ellesmere rejected them, agreeing with Aquinas that
“in words, we must look not whence they are derived, but to what
meaning they are put.”98 Ellesmere’s view on this point apparently
prevailed, with most of the other judges rejecting reliance on
etymologies and recognizing that judges merely “use them for
ornaments” if they happen to be consistent with the judgment in
the case.99
As Coke acknowledged, “oftentimes where the
propriety of words is attended to, the true sense is lost.”100

90
Ellesmere, supra note 48, at 678 (as translated from “omnis definitio in iure
ciuili est periculosa”).
91
Id. at 679 (as translated from “confusum est quicquid in puluerum sectum est”).
92
Id. (citing Bishop Juel).
93
Id. (as translated from “leuis et fallax, et plerumque ridicula”).
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id. (as translated from “tendiculæ verborum, et aucupationes syllabarum”).
97
E.K. Rand, Ioannes Saresberiensis Sillabizat, 1 SPECULUM 447, 447–48 (1926).
98
Ellesmere, supra note 48, at 679 (translation of phrase “in vocibus videndum,
non tàm à quo, quam ad quid sumantur” from EDMUND CAMPION, TEN REASONS
131 (1914)).
99
Calvin v. Smith (1608), 2 How. St. Tr. 607, 657 (Lord Coke).
100
Id. (translation of phrase “sæpenumero ubi proprietas verborum attenditur,
sensus veritatis amittitur” from BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1057 (St. Paul, West
Publishing Co. 1891)) (citation omitted).
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Ellesmere also rejected using contemporary Protestant
theology as a means of legal interpretation, arguing that “what I
do not read, I do not credit” may govern divinity, but does not
always govern the interpretation of laws.101 One must distinguish
morality from divinity to avoid confounding many things in civil
and politic government.102 And only professional judges with their
“depth of reason” should determine the law, “not the light and
shallow distempered reasons of common discoursers walking in
Powles, or at ordinaries, in their feasting and drinking, drowned
with drinke, or blowne away with a whiffe of tobacco.”103
None of these interpretive methods was sufficient to
determine the law, and therefore Ellesmere sought “a more certen
rule to iudge by.”104 That was the traditional method, which
English judges had used for centuries to determine cases governed
by both common and written law. He explained that judges should
rely on practical and analogical interpretation105 and “recur to
reason, and to the opinions of the wise.”106 By the traditional rule
of reason and responsa prudentum, justice “hath . . . beene duely
administred in England, and thereby the kings haue ruled, the
people haue beene gouerned, and the kingdome hath flourished for
many hundred yeeres; and then no such busie questionists moued
any quarrell against it.”107
The traditional approach did not apply exclusively to
interpreting the common law. It also applied to expounding the
most important texts of ancient English law, Magna Charta and
Charta de Forests;108 to the three foundational thirteenth-century
statutes of Westminster, some of whose provisions remain in force
today;109 and to lesser statutes enacted thereafter, including those
101

Ellesmere, supra note 48, at 674 (translation of phrase “quod non lego,
non credo” from OFFICIAL CALENDAR OF THE CHURCH 260 (Philadelphia, King &
Baird, 1849)).
102
Ellesmere, supra note 48, at 674 (“fidem moralem” from “fidem diuinam”).
103
Id. at 686.
104
Id. at 678–79.
105
Id. at 679.
106
Id. at 674 (as translated from “recurrere ad rationem, et ad responsa
prudentum”).
107
Id.
108
Id.; 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, LAW TRACTS iii (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1762)
(declaring no transaction in ancient English history more important than the
establishment of the Great Charter and the Charter of the Forest).
109
Ellesmere, supra note 48, at 674; Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw. 1 c. 5 (1275),
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Edw1/3/5/data.pdf (in-force provision guarantees
free elections); The Statute of Westminster II (De Donis Conditionalibus), 13 Edw. 1
st. 1 (1285), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Edw1/13/1 (in-force provision applies to
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“of fines, of vses, of willes, and many more.”110 None of Magna
Charta, Charta de Forests, and the Statutes of Westminster was
written in English; the traditional method applied regardless of
the text’s language and the passage of centuries from its
enactment.
Ellesmere then explained that for the same reason legal
interpretation does not follow strict rules of grammar:
By this rule it is also, that words are taken and construed,
sometimes by extension; sometimes by restriction; sometimes by
implication; sometimes a disjunctiue for a copulatiue; a
copulatiue for a disjunctiue; the present tense for the future; the
future for the present; sometimes by equity out of the reach of the
wordes; sometime words taken in a contrary sence; sometime
figuratiuely, as continens pro contento [the container for the
contents],111 and many other like: and of all these, examples be
infinite, as well in the ciuile lawe as common lawe.112

Ellesmere’s explanation was normative as well as descriptive.
He defended the traditional approach, including judicial
discretion, as positive law that is necessary to justice:
Thus arbitria iudicum [judicial decisions] and responsu
prudentum [opinions of the wise] haue beene receiued, allowed
and reuerenced in all times as positive lawe; and so it must be
still; for, otherwise much mischiefe and great inconuenience will
ensue. For new cases happen euery day: no lawe euer was, or
euer can be made, that can prouide remedie for all future cases,
or comprehend all circumstances of humane actions which iudges
are to determine . . . . They must therefore follow dictamen
rationis [the dictate of reason]; and so giue speedie justice. And
in many matters of materiall circumstances they must guide
themselues by discretion.113

He dismissed the argument that the traditional method of
interpretation makes the law too pliable, weak, and uncertain:
By the same reason it may be said, that all the lawes of all nations
are vncerten: for, in the ciuile lawe, which is taken to be the most
land law); Quia Emptores, 18 Edw. 1 c. 1 (1290), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/
Edw1/18/1/contents (Westminster 3: in-force provision applies to land law).
110
Ellesmere, supra note 48, at 674.
111
Id. at 675; see, e.g., 4 SELECT SERMONS AND LETTERS, OF DR. HUGH LATIMER
235 (Philadelphia, Wm. N. Engles, ed., 1842) (“[The] word Church sometimes signifies
the congregation, the people that are gathered together: and sometimes it signifies
the place where the people come together; Continens pro contento, that is to say, ‘The
thing that containeth, for that which is contained.’ ”) (1552 sermon).
112
Ellesmere, supra note 48, at 675.
113
Id. at 676.
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vniuersall and generall lawe in the world, they hould the same
rule and order in all cases which be out of the direct words of the
lawe; and such cases be infinite; for as I saide, new cases spring
euery day, as malice and fraude increaseth.114

Ellesmere detailed the institutional constraints that make the
traditional method of legal interpretation successful. Judges
should consult with each other and the Privy Council before
deciding cases.115 And only those who have four important
qualities should be allowed to become judges: “[T]here must be
grauitie, there must be learning, there must be experience, and
there must be authoritie: and if any one of these want, they are
not to be allowed to be interpreters of the lawe.”116
Finally,
Ellesmere
rejected
Coke’s
and
Bacon’s
characterization of the traditional interpretive approach, saying
that “in this I would not be mis-vnderstoode, as though I spake of
making of new lawes, or of altering the lawes now standing; I
meane not so, but I speake only of interpretation of the lawe in
new questions and doubts,”117 which he recognized were infinite in
number because “new cases spring euery day, as malice and fraude
increaseth.”118 Similarly, Nathaniel Bacon later criticized the
novel approach in Calvin’s Case for taking law to be limited to its
origins and determined by popular understanding:
[M]any times Laws are said to be many, when as they are but
one, branched into many particulars, for the clearing of the
peoples understanding, (who usually are not excellent in
distinguishing,) and so become as new Plaisters made of an old
Salve, for sores that never brake out before.119

IV. ANTICIPATING CONTEMPORARY DEBATES
The novelists and Ellesmere anticipated many important
matters that originalists and their critics debate today, including
(a) the alleged pliability of pluralism and the claim by Randy E.

114

Id. at 677.
See id. at 672, 675.
116
Id. at 686.
117
Id. at 693.
118
Id. at 677. Ellesmere also asserted that the common law evolves with time and
that in some cases judges change common law doctrines or disregard them as obsolete.
See, e.g., id. at 674, 676–78 (Belknappe’s case).
119
NATHANIEL BACON, THE CONTINUATION OF AN HISTORICALL DISCOURSE, OF
THE GOVERNMENT OF ENGLAND, UNTIL THE END OF THE REIGN OF QUEEN ELIZABETH.
WITH A PREFACE, BEING A VINDICATION OF THE ANCIENT WAY OF PARLIAMENTS IN
ENGLAND 76 (London, 1651).
115
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Barnett and others that only adhering to historical meaning can
provide “consistent, stable and faithful exercise of the
Constitution’s powers”;120 (b) Justice Brennan’s view that
constitutional principles reach far enough to apply to new
mischiefs, not only to those that gave them birth;121 (c) Jack M.
Balkin’s and Stephen M. Griffin’s emphasis on the constraining
power of tradition, legal institutions, judicial screening, and
professional legal culture;122 (d) Stephen M. Griffin’s assertion
that pluralism is the traditional method of legal interpretation and
originalism a departure from the status quo;123 (e) Philip Bobbitt’s
list of six modes of constitutional interpretation—text, history,
structure, doctrine, prudence, and ethics—and Christopher R.
Green’s criticism that Bobbitt cannot explain “how to choose
between them”;124 (f) H. Jefferson Powell’s identification of the
religious source of originalist interpretive methodologies;125
(g) Michael Stokes Paulsen’s criticism of those who condescend to
the public by treating the Constitution’s meaning as the private

120

Barnett, supra note 8, at 629; see also Colby & Smith, supra note 1, at 279
(“[W]ithout the constraint of constitutional text or history . . . ‘the judge has no basis
other than his own values upon which to’ ” decide cases. (quoting Robert H. Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 10 (1971)); id.
at 243 (Any other approach inevitably leads to “nihilism and the imposition of the
judge’s merely personal values on the rest of us.” (quoting Robert H. Bork, Styles in
Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 383, 387 (1985)).
121
William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, Text and Teaching Symposium, Georgetown University 7–8 (Oct. 12,
1985) (“Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.
Therefore, a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the
mischief which gave it birth.” (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
373 (1910))).
122
See Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 549, 551 (2009); Griffin, supra note 5, at 1207.
123
See Griffin, supra note 5, at 1187, 1195–96 (also noting that pluralism dates
back at least to the adoption of the Constitution).
124
See, e.g., Green, supra note 8, at 1617 n.21.
125
See Powell, supra note 1, at 885, 888–90. Powell explains that legal reform
movements in the American colonies and in interregnum England appealed to this
religious approach in order to revise laws to be clearer and more accessible to the
public, and that it was one of several conflicting cultural influences on the founding
generation’s approach to constitutional interpretation. Id. at 889–91. The arguments
in Calvin’s Case show that the approach took hold even earlier in English
jurisprudence.
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province of elitist judges;126 and (h) a consequence of Stephen E.
Sachs’s analysis that the only remedy for hard results in
constitutional cases is to amend the Constitution.127
Ellesmere’s challenge to novelists and originalists is even
broader than the specific points he makes in his opinion.
Ellesmere relied heavily on lessons from civil law practice,128 and
with good reason. Civil lawyers had tried and failed to establish a
theory of law like the one that the English novelists propounded.
Justinian designed the Corpus Juris Civilis to be a self-sufficient
statement of his empire’s laws and forbade any commentary on it
other than nominal exceptions, such as direct translation from
Latin to Greek.129
He prohibited legal interpretation,
characterizing it as a perversion of law that creates confusion
throughout the entire legal system:
We hereby prohibit [jurists] from producing any other
interpretations, or rather perversions, of our laws: lest their
verbosity should bring dishonour to our laws by its confusion, as
was done by the commentators on the Perpetual Edict, who by
extracting new senses from one or another part of this well-made
edict, reduced it to a multitude of meanings, causing confusion to
arise in nearly all Roman decrees.130

The penalty for violating the decree was “deportation and
confiscation of all property” to prevent verbosity from generating
further discord.131 Justinian recognized that human law cannot be
eternal or cover all cases, in part because “nature makes haste to
bring forth many new forms,” and therefore situations will arise
outside of “the web of the law.”132 But he insisted that where
obscurities or problems result, the Emperor alone must deal with
them because he alone has the authority to make law.133

126

Paulsen, supra note 13, at 875 (footnote omitted).
See Sachs, supra note 13, at 844 (“[T]o adhere to our current law . . . means
recognizing . . . only the future changes that are authorized by our rules of change.”);
id. at 845 (“We typically recognize something as part of ‘the text’ if it was in the
original Constitution or was added by an Article V amendment.”).
128
Ellesmere, supra note 48, at 669, 671, 673, 677, 693.
129
MACLEAN, supra note 89, at 50–51.
130
Id. at 52 (Maclean translation).
131
Id. at 51.
132
Id. (Maclean translation).
133
Id.
127
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The problem for Justinian was that his theory of law did not134
and could not135 work. It was the butt of satire and an
embarrassment to both jurists and historians.136 It fell before the
same theoretical and linguistic challenges that communicative
originalism faces, including (a) whether words contain the essence
of that which they signify or merely take their meaning from
conventional linguistic usage,137 (b) whether meaning is a
discovered fact or is imposed by the adjudicator,138 (c) whether to
seek legislators’ actual intentions or to construct those of a
fictitious legislator,139 (d) the collapse of determinate linguistic
meaning in the face of context,140 (e) the impossibility of
determining textual clarity as an objective fact,141 (f) the ambiguity
of “ambiguity,”142 and (g) the inability in practice to distinguish
and rely on literal, subjective and objective meanings, and on mens
legislatoris or ratio legis.143 As Ian Maclean concludes in his
134

See, e.g., id. at 52.
See, e.g., id. at 52–53 (ultimate circularity of specific leges).
136
See id. at 52–53.
137
See, e.g., id. at 110–11; cf. infra notes 592–599 and accompanying text.
138
MACLEAN, supra note 89, at 135; cf. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Corpus Linguistics
and the Criminal Law, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1503, 1525 (2018) (describing the role of
subjective personal judgment in determining meaning of legal texts even in corpus
linguistics theories).
139
MACLEAN, supra note 89, at 147; cf. Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA.
L. REV. 347, 358 (2005) (originalism that is “willing to take account of certain kinds of
information about the actual purposes and understandings of the specific legislators
who comprised the enacting Congress”); Lawson & Seidman, supra note 29, at 49
(originalism using a fictitious legislator, “We the People”).
140
MACLEAN, supra note 89, at 95–98; cf. infra notes 570–576 and accompanying
text.
141
See MACLEAN, supra note 89, at 89–90; cf. Hessick, supra note 138, at 1525
(detailing the role of context along with subjective personal judgment in determining
meaning of legal texts); William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain
Meaning Rule, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 539, 541 (2017) (criticizing the plain meaning rule
for unjustifiably attempting to transcend debate over intentionalism, textualism, and
other theories of statutory meaning).
142
MACLEAN, supra note 89, at 130–31 (whether there are two different meanings
that we cannot distinguish, or a single factual meaning that we lack sufficient
evidence to determine); cf. Solum, supra note 23, at 287, 294 (irreducible ambiguity
and the resulting need for constitutional construction); McGinnis & Rappaport, supra
note 32, at 774 (rejecting constitutional construction; interpreters must select the
interpretation supported by the stronger evidence and applicable interpretive rules,
as a result of which “there is no legal ambiguity or vagueness, regardless of whether
there is vagueness or ambiguity in the ordinary language”).
143
MACLEAN, supra note 89, at 142–47; see also id. at 200–01 (noting impasse “in
the dual requirement of a logical analysis of the words . . . according to conventional
rules of language and a determination of the intention behind their utterance”); id. at
201 (explaining that Renaissance English commentators were well aware of these
problems and of the fact that “it is logically impossible to distinguish between an
135
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landmark study of legal interpretation in the civil law, “the
problems which most preoccupy Renaissance jurists can have a
remarkably modern ring to them.”144
Despite its failure, Justinian’s approach remained a lodestar
for like-minded polemicists who blamed legal interpretation for
political and religious unrest and who championed “a clear,
unambiguous code of law as a bulwark against it,” asserting that
“a lucid, generally recognized set of statutes is clearly preferred to
any amount of jurisprudential interpretation.”145 As Johannes
Fichard wrote wistfully in 1535, “I only hope that what that
otherwise excellent emperor did not manage to bring
about . . . would come to pass at some time in this age . . . .”146
Many originalists continue to hope that it will come to pass in
our age.
Ellesmere’s opinion shows that pluralism is not only a
legitimate method of legal interpretation; it is the traditional
Anglo-American method of legal interpretation. Conceptual
originalism is inconsistent with Anglo-American legal practice.
Moreover, originalism, in all of its forms, is a normative aspiration
that harkens back as far as Justinian’s failed legal theory.
V. ORIGINALISM AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
This Part considers two versions of communicative
originalism in the context of the Commerce Clause, which
authorizes Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.”147 It focuses on the words “to regulate” and “commerce” in
several noted originalist interpretations.148

utterance which incorporates a given intention and one which uses the same formulas
of language but does not”); cf. 3 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 318 (John Bigelow ed., 1887) (“Such is the imperfection of our
language, and perhaps of all other languages, that, notwithstanding we are furnished
with dictionaries innumerable, we cannot precisely know the import of words, unless
we know of what party the man is that uses them.”).
144
MACLEAN, supra note 89, at 65.
145
See id. at 55.
146
See id. at 55 n.92 (Maclean translation).
147
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
148
Consequently, the analysis does not consider all of the originalists’ arguments
defending their interpretations.
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Wooden Communicative Originalism

After Brest, Powell, and others refuted original intent as a
theory of constitutional interpretation, originalists turned to
seeking the original public meaning of constitutional text. “[W]hat
the ratifiers . . . enact[ed] must be taken to be what the public of
that time would have understood the words to mean . . . . When
lawmakers use words, the law that results is what those words
ordinarily mean.”149 The meaning of constitutional text is
normally a matter of period common knowledge, following Lord
Bacon’s approach.150 Some originalists acknowledge an exception
for terms of art, noting that the public would recognize terms of
art and defer to experts in that art.151 The meaning of a legal term
of art follows from the understanding of learned lawyers, following
Lord Ellesmere’s approach.152
Original public meaning originalism began with a very limited
scope. Interpreters sought objective meanings of words through a
“mundane [and] ‘wooden’ ” interpretive method that relied
principally on dictionary definitions, etymologies and common
meanings.153 Context played little role.
Lawrence B. Solum provided a relatively narrow version of
this theory. He wrote that constitutional interpretation consists
of determining or discovering “the semantic content or
linguistic meaning of the constitutional text” where that semantic
meaning “is a fact about the world.”154 Meaning in constitutional
communication is limited to a discrete unit: each clause within the
Constitution.155 An interpreter must consider each in the context

149

ROBERT H. BORK,
THE LAW 144 (1990).
150

THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF

See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Natural Born Citizen
Clause, 107 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 22, 25 (2007) (observing that an
ordinary citizen reading phrases like “letters of marque and reprisal” in the
Constitution would recognize them as technical legal language and defer to the public
meaning of the phrases as understood by lawyers and by other citizens who had
consulted lawyers about them).
152
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
153
See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 8, at 621–22 (quoting Gary Lawson, In Praise of
Woodenness, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 21, 22 & n.8 (1988)); Barnett, supra note 13,
at 101, 125.
154
Lawrence B. Solum, A Reader’s Guide to Semantic Originalism and a Reply to
Professor Griffin 2–3 (draft of Feb. 18, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1130665).
155
Id. at 4, 7.
151
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of the rest of the Constitution but cannot view the Constitution as
a whole as a unit of meaning or it will become “one long primal
scream.”156
Context plays no role unless a word or clause’s semantic
content is ambiguous.157 In that case, one may appeal to a narrow
context: “the whole text, the basic facts about framing and
ratification, and so forth.”158 Fundamental to this view is that
“[t]he linguistic meaning of a constitutional utterance is not the
conclusion of a normative argument—it is a fact determined by
conventional semantic meaning and the rules of syntax at the time
of utterance.”159
Randy E. Barnett allowed a somewhat greater role for context,
explaining:
The most common way of doing this is by resorting to
dictionaries, and this is a useful starting point. But when
interpreting the meaning conveyed by a writing, . . . one must
take the context in which a word or phrase appears into account,
combined with how these words are used elsewhere in the
document and the general purposes for these clauses that can be
ascertained from the document itself and from circumstances
surrounding its formation.160

Nevertheless, Barnett acknowledged that the wooden version
of communicative originalism can be very disappointing for many
who “expect to see a richly detailed legislative history only to find
references to dictionaries, common contemporary meanings, and
logical inferences from the structure and general purposes of the
text.”161 But so be it: “That is the way the objective approach to
contract interpretation proceeds, and that is how the new
originalism based on original meaning proceeds as well.”162 Words
must be taken in accordance with their “generally accepted
meanings that are ascertainable independently of any one of our
subjective opinions about that meaning.”163

156

Id. at 8–9. This theory of semantic originalism is not entirely wooden. Beyond
recognizing a limited role for context, it also accepts that the Constitution may use
terms of art, may include meanings by implication, and creates new terms and gives
them meaning—for example, “House of Representatives.” Id. at 4–5.
157
Id. at 2.
158
Id. at 14.
159
Id. at 41.
160
Barnett, supra note 8, at 633–34.
161
Id. at 621.
162
Id.
163
Id. at 633.
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Wooden originalism breaks down the term “to regulate
commerce” into two parts, the verb “to regulate” and the object
“commerce.” It relies heavily on dictionary definitions and
etymologies to define the two. However, this method quickly
breaks down in practice. Consider originalist interpretations of
the meaning of “commerce.”
Justice Thomas relies on the etymology of “commerce,” which
he explains is “with merchandise,”164 and on period dictionary
definitions by Johnson, Bailey, and Sheridan.165 He concludes that
at adoption, “commerce” meant “selling, buying, and bartering, as
well as transporting for these purposes.”166 Raoul Berger, by
contrast, concludes that “commerce” originally meant “the
interchange of goods by one State with another.”167
Problems appear immediately with these two ostensibly
objective, factual public meanings. They are incongruous. Justice
Thomas’s definition includes “transporting,” but Berger’s does not;
nor do the dictionary definitions that Thomas relies on. Does
commerce involve only merchandise, consistent with Justice
Thomas’s etymology, or goods more broadly, according to Berger?
Is there a difference between the two, and are there any other
objects of commerce? Does “commerce” mean any interchange, or
specifically selling, buying, and bartering?
Other period reference works create more issues. Jacob’s Law
Dictionary, the most widely used law dictionary in the early
Republic,168 explains that “trade” and “commerce” are separate but
often confounded, with “commerce” properly relating only to trade
with foreign states.169 Under this definition the Constitution’s
reference to “Commerce with foreign Nations” is redundant, and
its reference to “Commerce . . . among the several States” is
oxymoronic. Trusler details finer distinctions among types of
164
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 586 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring),
quoted in Barnett, supra note 13, at 101 n.4 and accompanying text.
165
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585–86 (Thomas, J., concurring), quoted in Barnett,
supra note 13, at 101 & n.3 and accompanying text.
166
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring), quoted in Barnett,
supra note 13, at 101.
167
See Raoul Berger, Judicial Manipulation of the Commerce Clause, 74 TEX.
L. REV. 695, 703 (1996), quoted in Barnett, supra note 13, at 103 n.20 and
accompanying text.
168
See Gary L. McDowell, The Politics of Meaning: Law Dictionaries and the
Liberal Tradition of Interpretation, 44 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 257, 260–61, 261
n.25 (2000).
169
GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW-DICTIONARY (London, 10th ed. 1782) (unpaginated;
quotations within the definition of “Inland Trade”).
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interchange: “[T]rade[] seems to imply the manufacturing and
vending of merchandise within . . . ; commerce, negotiating with
other countries”; and “traffic,” the bartering “with nations[] that
have not the use of money.”170 He also distinguishes objects of
interchange by the party that deals with them: “Merchants deal
in merchandize, and manufacturers and shopkeepers in wares.
Merchandize is more the object of commerce; wares of trade.”171
Neither Thomas’s nor Berger’s proposed definition is consistent
with the other or with these period reference works.
It is remarkable that originalists propounded the wooden
communicative theory in the first place. Founding-era materials
undermine any claim that wooden and mundane meanings of
English words or grammatical rules for their use existed as facts
in the world that could determine the law. John Adams wrote in
1780 that
to this day, there is no grammar nor dictionary extant, of the
English language, which has the least public authority, and it is
only very lately, that a tolerable dictionary has been published
even by a private person, and there is not yet a passable grammar
enterprized by any individual.172

The great lexicographer Samuel Johnson found English to be
disordered, and the creation of his dictionary to require his own
choices without any guiding principles or test of purity.173 He
found English to be
copious without order, and energetick without rules: wherever I
turned my view, there was perplexity to be disentangled,
and confusion to be regulated; choice was to be made out of
boundless variety, without any established principle of selection;
adulterations were to be detected, without a settled test of purity;
and modes of expression to be rejected or received, without the
suffrages of any writers of classical reputation or acknowledged
authority.174

170

See 1 JOHN TRUSLER, THE DIFFERENCE, BETWEEN WORDS, ESTEEMED
SYNONYMOUS, IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE; AND, THE PROPER CHOICE OF THEM
DETERMINED 169–70 (London, 1766).
171
1 JOHN TRUSLER, THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WORDS ESTEEMED
SYNONYMOUS IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, POINTED OUT, AND THE PROPER CHOICE
OF THEM DETERMINED 153 (London, 3d ed. 1794).
172
CORRESPONDENCE OF THE LATE PRESIDENT ADAMS 161 (Boston, Everett &
Munroe 1809).
173
1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London,
W. Strahan 1755) (unpaginated; first preface page).
174
Id.
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He found the very concepts of definition and explanation of words
to be difficult, if not impossible. “To interpret a language by itself
is very difficult . . . . When the nature of things is unknown, or the
notion unsettled and indefinite, and various in various minds, the
words by which such notions are conveyed, or such things denoted,
will be ambiguous and perplexed.”175 Johnson had no confidence
that etymologies had any bearing on the current meanings of
words, and included them only to help understand words’
figurative senses.176 In this, Johnson follows Aquinas, who pointed
out that “lapis may well be derived from laesio pedis, but that
does not entail that a piece of iron on which one stubs one’s foot is
a stone.”177
It is notable that Adams derided all extant grammars, because
Samuel Johnson’s dictionary included one. It consisted of seven
pages on etymology,178 four on orthography,179 two on prosody,180
and a mere five sentences on syntax.181 His introduction all but
dismisses syntax in English, stating that construction of the
language “neither requires nor admits many rules. Wallis
therefore has totally omitted it; and Johnson, whose desire of
following the writers upon the learned languages made him think
a syntax indispensably necessary, has published such petty
observations as were better omitted.”182 Unsurprisingly, one
strains to find works by originalists that use period grammars to
interpret the Constitution, even though many argue that
constitutional interpretation should rely on period grammar, in
particular on syntax.183

175

Id. (fifth preface page).
See id. (sixth preface page).
177
MACLEAN, supra note 89, at 110 (footnote omitted).
178
JOHNSON, supra note 173 (fourth grammar page; describing etymology as “the
deduction of one word from another, and the various modifications by which the sense
of the same word is diversified; as horse, horses; I love, I loved”).
179
Id. (first grammar page; describing orthography as “the art of combining
letters into syllables, and syllables into words”).
180
Id. (eleventh grammar page; describing prosody as “the rules of pronunciation”
and “the laws of versification”).
181
Id. (eleventh grammar page).
182
Id.
183
See, e.g., Solum, supra note 154, at 41.
176
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B. Sophisticated Communicative Originalism
In response to the problems of wooden communicative
originalism,184 many originalists have expanded their interpretive
approaches to give context a more meaningful role. Some delve
deeply into records of the Philadelphia convention,185 the
ratification debates,186 general political, philosophical, economic
and legal history,187 and other sources188 to determine the
meanings of words and phrases in the Constitution. Lawrence B.
Solum shifts his theory to acknowledge that semantics and syntax
do not fully determine the content of written communication.189
Instead, the meaning “is almost always partly a function of the
context in which the communication occurs.”190 One emerging area
of contextual analysis is corpus linguistics, which uses databases
of period legal texts, “letters, newspapers, sermons, books, and
other materials” to analyze how words and phrases were used
in various contexts during specified periods.191 It shows the
interpreter far more period uses of words and phrases than
wooden definitions found in dictionaries and treatises. Many
argue that it can make originalism empirical192 and scientific.193
Randy E. Barnett offers a sophisticated communicative
analysis of the Commerce Clause,194 seeking “the meaning a
reasonable speaker of English would have attached to the words,
phrases, sentences, etc.” in the clause “at the time the particular
provision was adopted.”195 He grapples with two major issues
involving “commerce.” The first is whether commerce includes
184
See, e.g., Phillips, Ortner, & Lee, supra note 31, at 22–23 (detailing evidentiary
problems, particularly with regard to dictionaries).
185
See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 13, at 126.
186
Id.
187
See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson & David Kopel, Commerce in the Commerce
Clause: A Response to Jack Balkin, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 55,
56–58 (2010).
188
See Josh Blackman & James C. Phillips, Corpus Linguistics and the Second
Amendment, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Aug. 7, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/
corpus-linguistics-and-the-second-amendment/.
189
Solum, supra note 23, at 273.
190
Id. at 273.
191
Blackman & Phillips, supra note 188 (corpus linguistics); see, e.g., Phillips,
Ortner, & Lee, supra note 31 at 24–27 (corpus linguistics).
192
See, e.g., Phillips, Ortner, & Lee, supra note 31, at 23–24.
193
See Clark D. Cunningham & Jesse Egbert, Scientific Methods for Analyzing
Original Meaning: Corpus Linguistics and the Emoluments Clauses 1–2, 6 (Feb. 12,
2019) (unpublished manuscript) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=3321438).
194
See generally Barnett, supra note 13.
195
Id. at 105.
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transportation. This is a significant issue for originalists, given
the large number of eighteenth-century references to commerce
that include shipping, transportation, and navigation.196 Barnett
concludes that the original meaning of “commerce” includes
“navigation” because of its “intimate connection to the activity
of trading.”197
The second issue is whether “commerce” differs from “trade,”
given numerous eighteenth-century uses of the words separately.
Barnett concludes that “trade and commerce” was merely a
couplet—like “ ‘full and complete’ stop”—that “refers to a single
activity that could be, and usually was, called either trade
or commerce.”198
Consequently, Barnett concludes that “[c]ommerce” means
only “the trade or exchange of goods (including the means of
transporting them).”199 It does not mean “intercourse” broadly, nor
does it include all “commercial” activities200 like agriculture,201
manufacturing,202 or insurance.203
Barnett’s approach differs significantly from wooden
applications of syntax to meanings of individual words. First,
multi-word phrases can have their own meaning separate from the
meanings of their individual words.204 Second, the meaning of a
phrase is not dependent on whether it includes a copulative or a
disjunctive: “[T]rade and commerce” has the same meaning as
“trade or commerce,” “trade” alone, or “commerce” alone. Third, a
definition can include multiple items that are facially distinct as
long as they are intimately connected, such as trade and
transportation. Fourth, context can separate the meanings of
words that have the same etymology—“commercial” activities, for
example, are not necessarily activities in “commerce” despite their
common root and despite the fact that a principal definition of
“commercial” is “[e]ngaged in commerce; trading.”205
196

Id. at 122, 125.
Id. at 125.
198
Id. at 124.
199
Id. at 146.
200
Id. at 119–20.
201
Id. at 136.
202
Id.
203
Id. at 120.
204
Cf. Phillips, Ortner, & Lee, supra note 31, at 23 (arguing that period
dictionaries defined words, not phrases, whereas corpus linguistics identifies the
meaning of phrases).
205
Commercial, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, def. 1.a (2019), http://www.oed.
com/view/Entry/37081?redirectedFrom=commerical#eid.
197
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How strong is Barnett’s argument, and what does it say
about originalism?
For ordinary words like “commerce,”
originalists should look to “quotidian” usage in the corpora.206
Eighteenth-century public uses of “commerce” show a far broader
understanding than Barnett’s definition, and the extent of popular
usage shows that ordinary speakers of English did not use it as a
term of art. Eighteenth-century usage included the “commerce of
insurance.”207 For example, there was a longstanding debate
whether government should prohibit insuring enemy property
during wartime. Many opposed any prohibition, arguing that “it
would be highly impolitic to lay such a restraint on the commerce
of insurance” because it was highly profitable at the enemy’s
expense.208 The debate was carried on over many years,209 and the
popular press reported it, including using the term “commerce of
insurance.”210 Similarly, a 1686 French edict provided that those
who “enter into the partnership and commerce of insurance, shall
not be degraded from their nobility” and prohibited all but
members of one company “to carry on any commerce of insurance
and bottomry in the city of Paris.”211
Many eighteenth-century uses of “commerce” involve matters
other than goods, such as “commerce of land,”212 “commerce
in money,”213 and “commerce in slaves.”214 Benjamin Franklin
characterized payments made to secure enactment of laws as a
“Kind of Commerce.”215 Nor was the commerce of transportation
206

Cf. Phillips, Ortner, & Lee, supra note 31, at 24.
THOMAS MORTIMER, THE ELEMENTS OF COMMERCE, POLITICS AND FINANCES,
IN THREE TREATISES ON THOSE IMPORTANT SUBJECTS 176 (London, 1772); cf. GREAT
BRITAIN, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE COURT OF KING’S BENCH
xiii (London, 1766) (reporter’s preface: “Trade and commerce are likewise interested
in this publication [of judicial precedents]. How many cases relative to bills of
exchange, notes of hand, insurances, charter parties, and stocks, are every day
determined.”).
208
MORTIMER, supra note 207, at 176.
209
See, e.g., JOHN WESKETT, A COMPLETE DIGEST OF THE THEORY, LAWS AND
PRACTICE OF INSURANCE 197 (Dublin, 1783).
210
See Art. V. A Complete Digest of the Theory, Laws, and Practice of Insurance,
64 MONTHLY REV.; OR, LITERARY J. 205, 206 (1781).
211
WESKETT, supra note 209, at 91 (as translated into English).
212
HENRY HOME, REMARKABLE DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF SESSION, FROM THE
YEAR 1730 TO THE YEAR 1752, at 129 (Edinburgh, 1766).
213
Retribution, 9 ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA 6685 (Edinburgh, 1782); 6 GREAT
BRITAIN, THE PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER 218 (London, 1782).
214
11 THE MODERN PART OF AN UNIVERSAL HISTORY FROM THE EARLIEST
ACCOUNTS TO THE PRESENT TIME 200 (London, 1781).
215
Benjamin Franklin, Preface to Joseph Galloway’s Speech, NAT’L ARCHIVES
(Aug. 11, 1764), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-11-02-0083.
207
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limited to transporting goods for trade or exchange. The
transportation of free persons for profit was also considered trade
and commerce.216
Finally, a 1789 treatise on the origin of commerce217 lists a
myriad of statutes enacted “relative to trade and commerce.”218
These include statutes encouraging or establishing specific types
of agriculture,219 manufacturing,220 and fisheries;221 regulating or
taxing life, property and casualty insurance and annuities;222
regulating employees, their work opportunities, and wages;223
regulating the operations of a trading company;224 preventing and

216

Pennsylvania Assembly, Reply to the Governor, NAT’L ARCHIVES (May 15,
1755), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-06-02-0018 (“[T]he Bill
itself was calculated to lay Restraints upon the Trade carried on by the Importers of
[sick] Passengers, &c. and we have, in all our Considerations upon it, endeavoured to
make it answer those Purposes, without interfering with the other Branches of our
Commerce, not subject to the same fatal Consequences.”).
217
4 ADAM ANDERSON, AN HISTORICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL DEDUCTION OF THE
ORIGIN OF COMMERCE, FROM THE EARLIEST ACCOUNTS (London, William Combe
ed. 1789).
218
See id. at Index (“Laws enacted in this year relative to trade and commerce”).
219
See id. at 131 (“For further encouraging the growth of silk in America”); id. at
167 (“For the better cultivating common arable fields”); id. at 261 (“To repeal so much
of several acts of Parliament, as prohibit the growth and produce of tobacco in Ireland,
and to permit the importation of tobacco of the growth and produce of that kingdom
into Great Britain, &c.”); id. at 539 (“For the further encouraging the growth of coffee
and cocoa nuts, in his Majesty’s islands and plantations in America”).
220
See id. at 167 (“For establishing a plate-glass manufactory”); id. at 208 (“For
continuing the encouragement of making indigo in the plantations, &c.”); id. at 261
(“For better encouraging the Irish linen manufactory”); id. at 539 (“For the more
effectual encouragement of the manufactures of flax and cotton in Great Britain”); id.
at 605 (“Respecting the manufacture and importation of cordage for shipping”).
221
See id. at 188 (“For the encouragement of the fisheries carried on from Great
Britain, Ireland, and the British dominions in Europe”); id. at 261 (“For the better
encouraging the white herring fishery”).
222
See id. at 176 (“For better regulating insurances upon lives, and for prohibiting
all such insurances, except in cases, where the persons insuring shall have any
interest in the life or death of the person insured”); id. at 208 (“For registering the
grants of life annuities, and for the better protection of infants against such grants”);
id. at 459 (“For charging duty on persons whose property shall be insured against loss
by fire”); id. at 605 (“For regulating insurances on ships, goods, &c.”).
223
See id. at 167 (“To regulate the wages or prices of journeymen weavers” and
“To enable certain persons to work a pestle mill at Tunbridge”); id. at 207 (“For
settling the hours of labour, and the prices of taking apprentices, in the hat
manufactory”); id. at 208 (“To allow the callico printers and dyers to employ
journeymen who have not served a regular apprenticeship to the said trade”).
224
See id. at 167 (“For establishing certain rules and orders for the future
management of the affairs of the East India Company”); id. at 207 (“For regulating
the affairs of the East India Company, as well in Europe as in India, so far as relates
to altering the time for the choice of Directors”).
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punishing fraud in trades,225 manufacturing,226 and the payment
of employee wages;227 granting or extending copyrights and
patents;228 preventing fires;229 encouraging lending against real
property;230 and preventing the pawning of certain goods and the
easy redemption of pawns.231
Critics quickly pointed out that eighteenth century usage was
broader than originalists supposed. Grant Nelson and Robert
Pushaw, Jr., for example, argued that James Wilson used
“commerce” to refer to all gainful activity including business
services like insurance.232 Barnett responds that Wilson was
actually referring to “the objects of commerce,” suggesting that he
considered “commerce” to refer only to the “items being traded.”233
Yet there are many eighteenth-century uses that call non-goods
“object[s] of commerce” or “subject[s] of commerce” including
agriculture,234 land,235 money,236 capital stock companies,237

225
See id. at 167 (“For altering the punishment of persons fraudulently marking
of plate”); id. at 207 (“For preventing frauds in combing wool”).
226
See id. at 176 (“To amend an act for the more effectually preventing frauds and
abuses by persons employed in the manufacture of hats, woollen, linen, and cotton
manufactures”); id. at 262 (“To prevent frauds by private distillers”).
227
See id. at 262 (“To prevent frauds and abuses in the payment of wages to
persons employed in the bone and thread-lace manufactory”); id. at 630 (“For the
further preventing frauds in the payment of seamen’s wages, &c.”).
228
See id. at 188 (“To enable the different universities in Great Britain, and the
colleges of Eton, Westminster, and Winchester, to hold, in perpetuity, their copy-right
in books given or bequeathed to them, for the advancement of learning” and “[t]o
enlarge the term of letters patent granted to William Clockworth, for the sole use of a
discovery of certain materials for the making of porcelain”); id. at 207 (“To enlarge Mr.
Hartley’s patent, for his invention of iron plates to prevent the fatal consequences of
fires” and “[t]o secure to engravers their property in the engraving branch”).
229
See id. at 605 (“Respecting party walls, and for the more effectually preventing
mischiefs by fire, and for extending the provisions of this act, so far as relates to
manufactories of pitch, &c. throughout England”).
230
See id. at 167 (“To encourage the subjects of foreign states to lend money upon
estates in the West Indies”).
231
See id. at 630 (“To prevent the unlawful pawning of goods, and easy redemption
of goods pawned, &c.”).
232
Barnett, supra note 13, at 120.
233
Id.
234
1 MALACHY POSTLETHWAYT, BRITAIN’S COMMERCIAL INTEREST EXPLAINED
AND IMPROVED 101, 130, 138 (London, 1757).
235
JOHN MILLAR, AN HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT 202
(London, 1790).
236
1 WILLIAM ROBERTSON, THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF THE EMPEROR
CHARLES V 401 (London, 6th ed. 1787).
237
THOMAS POWNELL, THE RIGHT, INTEREST, AND DUTY, OF GOVERNMENT 6
(London, 2d ed. 1781).
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peerages,238 and the art of engraving.239 Land is the “principal
subject of commerce,”240 the “most natural subject of commerce”241
and “the great object of commerce” in part because it “afford[s] the
highest security that can be given for payment of debt.”242
Agriculture is “the first object of commerce.”243
A British writer explained in 1757, for example, that when
“England prohibited the exportation of corn, she did not consider
agriculture in the light of commerce, and very frequently suffered
scarcity,” resulting in high wages for workers; then, “[w]hen
England, more sensible of her true interests, began to consider
agriculture as an object of commerce, she found it was impossible,
by restoring plenty of corn, to lower the high wages the dearness
of provisions had occasioned.”244 The government then took land
use measures to deal with the wage issue.245 The writer described
agriculture—the productive activity—as an object of commerce,
and he noted the range of causes and effects that the government
addressed when dealing with that object of commerce, including
wages and land use.
“Commerce” clearly had much broader public usage than
Barnett’s restrictive definition. How then does Barnett conclude
that “commerce” had such a narrow public meaning? First, he
limits the scope of relevant context. He purports to identify
“original meaning” in “the meaning a reasonable speaker of
English would have attached to the words, phrases, sentences, etc.
at the time the particular provision was adopted,”246 which he
claims is objective because “it looks to the public meaning
conveyed by the words used in the Constitution, rather than to the
subjective intentions of its framers or ratifiers.”247 Yet he argues
that “[t]he most persuasive evidence of original meaning” is
limited to “statements made during the drafting and ratification
238

SIR DAVID DALRYMPLE, THE ADDITIONAL CASE OF ELISABETH, CLAIMING
TITLE AND DIGNITY OF COUNTESS OF SUTHERLAND, BY HER GUARDIANS 80
(London, 1770).
239
10 JAMES ANDERSON, THE BEE 299 (Edinburgh, Mundell & Son 1792).
240
HENRY HOME, ESSAYS UPON SEVERAL SUBJECTS CONCERNING BRITISH
ANTIQUITIES 157–58 (Edinburgh, 3d ed. 1763).
241
HOME, supra note 212, at 130.
242
HENRY HOME, HISTORICAL LAW-TRACTS 145 (Edinburgh, 2d ed. 1761).
243
JOHN ARBUTHNOT, AN INQUIRY INTO THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE
PRESENT PRICE OF PROVISIONS, AND THE SIZE OF FARMS 35 (London, 1773).
244
POSTLETHWAYT, supra note 234, at 138.
245
See id. at 138–39.
246
Barnett, supra note 13, at 105.
247
Id.
THE
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of the Constitution as well as dictionary definitions and The
Federalist Papers”248 because “usage outside the context of drafting
and ratification may mislead us as to what the particular words of
a particular measure meant at the time of its enactment. Far from
providing useful ‘context,’ such historical evidence may instead
cloud what was otherwise a fairly clear meaning.”249
This is simply a retreat to seeking the original intent of the
drafters or ratifiers, which Brest and Powell have already refuted.
It also evades the question of how to determine the original public
meaning of words in the Constitution. Restricting context hides
ambiguity and unclarity that exist in public usage. In addition,
The Federalist Papers were partisan arguments written by only a
few men. James Madison later cautioned against relying on them
too much because, owing to human nature, they were sometimes
works of zealous advocacy.250
Barnett concludes that “commerce” includes “navigation”
because of its intimate connection to trading. Others might
equally conclude that “commerce” includes insurance, agriculture,
manufacturing, and other productive activities because of their
intimate connection to trade and interchange, or because many
founding-era ordinary and legal public uses of “commerce” include
such activities. This prevents the identification of an original
public meaning as a non-normative fact about the world.
Barnett’s ultimate defense of his definition of “commerce” is
telling:
I am not disputing here that “commerce” had a broad as well as
a narrow meaning, or that many . . . strongly favored a national
government powerful enough to govern all “gainful activities.” I
only dispute, on the basis of the evidence of usage presented here
and the clash of interests that existed in the country at the time,
that a government of so unlimited a power was adopted in
1789.251

Barnett reasons backwards. He relies on the political
compromise that he believes was struck to determine the public
meaning of constitutional text, rather than using the public

248

Id. at 146.
Id. at 107.
250
James Madison, Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston, NAT’L
ARCHIVES (Apr. 17, 1824), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-0302-0291, cited in Powell, supra note 1, at 936 n.262.
251
Barnett, supra note 13, at 131 (footnote omitted).
249
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meaning of the text to determine what compromise was struck.
His definition is ultimately normative. The meaning he ascribes
to “commerce” is his own subjective opinion.
Barnett takes a similarly normative approach to determining
the original public meaning of “to regulate.” He argues that the
verb “to regulate” means only “to make regular”—that is, to tell
people how to do something if they choose to do it.252 The verb does
not include the power to command activity.253 Nor does it include
the power to prohibit any activity.254 Barnett cites Johnson’s
dictionary definition of “to regulate” as “1. To adjust by rule or
method . . . . 2. To direct,”255 which is distinct from Johnson’s
definition of “to prohibit,” which is “1. To forbid; to interdict by
authority . . . . 2. To debar; to hinder.”256 Barnett states that
Johnson does not define either “in terms of the other; each seems
quite distinct.”257 Barnett concludes that “[t]he power to regulate
is, in essence, the power to say, ‘if you want to do something, here
is how you must do it.’ ”258
Yet the very definition of “to regulate” that Barnett cites
includes “to direct,” which would authorize the government to
direct persons to engage in commerce. Johnson defines “[t]o
[d]irect” to include “[t]o prescribe certain measure” and “[t]o order;
to command.”259 His definition of “[t]o prescribe” includes “to
order” and “[t]o influence arbitrarily.”260
In addition, the most common founding-era uses of regulating
commerce in America involved restrictions or prohibitions.261
Pre-adoption English and British legal uses also contradict
Barnett. Statutes for the “regulation” of activities included
252

Id. at 139.
Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health
Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 582–83 (2010).
254
Barnett, supra note 13, at 139.
255
Id. (quoting SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(6th ed. 1785)).
256
Id. (quoting SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(6th ed. 1785)).
257
Id. at 140.
258
Id. at 139.
259
See JOHNSON, supra note 173; see also Robert G. Natelson, To “Regulate”
Commerce Means More than To “Make It Regular”, TENTH AMEND. CTR. (Dec. 27,
2011), https://tenthamendmentcenter.com/2011/12/27/to-regulate-commerce-meansmore-than-to-make-it-regular/ (describing similar definitions in multiple period
dictionaries).
260
2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London,
1755).
261
See Natelson, supra note 259.
253
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prohibitions, such as an act for the regulation of insurance that
prohibited certain types of insurance and virtually all types of
reinsurance;262 “[a]n Act to regulate [b]uying and [s]elling of [h]ay
and [s]traw” that prohibited many such transactions;263 and an act
regulating a trade that prohibited most persons from practicing
the trade.264 As a jurist and central figure in the Scottish
Enlightenment265 noted in 1777, “[i]t is the privilege of every state
to regulate matters within its own territory. The legislature may,
in particular, prohibit certain goods to be imported, whether by
natives or by foreigners.”266
It is clear that public usage of “to regulate” included “to
prohibit.” So Barnett turns to circumstantial and purposive
arguments to argue that “to regulate” does not include the power
to prohibit commerce “among the several States” even though it
does include the power to prohibit commerce “with foreign
Nations” and “with the Indian Tribes.”
He appeals to
267
“circumstantial textual evidence”
and to purported “known
purposes of the founders,”268 which differed for regulating
commerce among the three jurisdictions, “as is well known.”269
Barnett does not objectively justify his reliance on purposes of
the founders rather than of the ratifiers or of the American public.
Nor does he objectively justify his preference for some “well
known” purposes over others. He acknowledges that evidence of
purposes could be a reversion to original intent originalism, but
argues that “evidence of publicly known purposes helps to shape
the original public meaning of words and phrases.”270 Given the
many conflicting purposes involved in the creation and adoption of
262
See An Act to Regulate Insurance on Ships Belonging to the Subjects of Great
Britain, and on Merchandizes or Effects Laden Thereon, 19 Geo. 2 c. 37, §§ 1, 4 (1746).
263
See An Act to Regulate the Buying and Selling of Hay and Straw, etc., 36 Geo.
3 c. 38, § 8 (1796).
264
See An Act for Regulating the Trade of Silk-Throwing, 13 & 14 Car. 2 c. 15,
§ 2 (1662).
265
See Gordon Graham, Henry Home, Lord Kames (1696–1782), INST. FOR THE
STUDY OF SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY, http://www.scottishphilosophy.org/philosophers/
henry-home/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2019).
266
HENRY HOME, ELUCIDATIONS RESPECTING THE COMMON AND STATUTE LAW OF
SCOTLAND 149 (Edinburgh, 1777).
267
See Barnett, supra note 13, at 144.
268
See id. at 144 n.207.
269
See id. at 145 (outlining different purposes for granting Congress the power to
regulate trade with foreign nations than among the states, “as is well known”); id. at
146 (detailing purported different purposes of the power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations than among the states).
270
See id. at 146 n.213.
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the Constitution, including the purpose of strengthening the
federal government relative to the Articles of Confederation,
only a reversion to original intent or the interpreter’s own
normative judgment can justify one purposive interpretation of
the commerce power over another.
Barnett’s interpretive
approach is surprisingly similar to a target of Michael Stokes
Paulsen’s criticism: identifying an abstract principle in the
Constitution, assigning it a specific content based on the
interpreter’s own discernment, then infusing that content into
particular constitutional provisions.271
Barnett’s interpretation assigns two contrary, original public
meanings to the same verb with respect to different direct objects
in the same constitutional clause. He severs the meaning of the
words from the plain syntax of the clause; his discernment of
purposes, not the linguistic meaning of the word, controls.272 He
follows Ellesmere, who notes that words are often construed “in a
contrary sense.”273
Barnett apparently recognizes this issue for his proposed
original public meaning of “to regulate.” He responds that words
can be ambiguous, noting contracts cases in which two different
counterparties mean different things by the same word, such as
each referring to a different ship with the same name “Peerless.”274
However, the Commerce Clause has only one putative collective
author. Barnett’s analogy cannot apply to the objective meaning
of a single verb that a single author applies to three direct objects
in the same clause. He ultimately retreats to original intended
purpose to interpret the clause: “[W]hen a group of people agrees
to use one word to connote, depending on the circumstances, two
different meanings, they have objectively manifested their
intentions, albeit in an awkward manner that makes the objective
meaning of their words sometimes difficult to discern.”275
Barnett’s interpretation cannot follow from an ordinary English
speaker’s understanding of the meaning of “to regulate.” It can

271

See Paulsen, supra note 13, at 878–79.
Cf. Natelson, supra note 259 (“[I]n the Commerce Clause the verb ‘regulate’
has three objects, not just one: interstate, foreign, and Indian commerce. Under
Founding-Era (as well as modern) rules of interpretation you should read ‘regulate’
the same way for all three.”).
273
See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
274
See Barnett, supra note 13, at 144 n.207 (citing Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 Hurl.
& C. 906, 159 Eng.Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864)).
275
Id. at 145 n.207.
272
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only reflect a retreat to original intent or a construction by a
scholar applying legal interpretive techniques to a verb that is not
a term of art.
Barnett’s ultimate defense of his interpretation of “to
regulate” in the context of directing individuals to engage
in commerce is also normative. He acknowledges that the
Constitution allows the federal government to commandeer
individuals.276 But he argues that the power is limited: “The very
few mandates that are imposed on the people pertain to their
fundamental duties as citizens of the United States, such as the
duty to defend the country or to pay for its operation.”277 The claim
that some duties are fundamental and allow commandeering but
others are not is purely normative. Barnett exercises his own
normative judgment about the duties of citizens to determine the
meaning of a constitutional term rather than using the meaning
of the term to determine the individual’s duties. The Preamble
specifies both “promot[ing] the general Welfare” and “provid[ing]
for the common defence” as purposes for which “We the
People . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United
States of America.”278
Directing individuals to engage in
commerce, such as purchasing health insurance, to promote the
general welfare is no different in this context from directing them
to pay taxes to promote the general welfare or to serve in the
armed forces to provide for the common defense.
Originalist interpretations of the Emoluments Clauses
demonstrate the same reliance on their authors’ own normative
judgments, as Part VI shows.
VI. ORIGINALISM AND THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSES
This Part evaluates communicative originalism in the context
of litigation over the application of the Constitution’s Emoluments
Clauses to President Trump’s business activities with federal
agencies and state and foreign governments. The Constitution
contains three Emoluments Clauses:
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which
he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the
Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or
the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such

276
277
278

Barnett, supra note 253, at 582–83.
Id.
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States,
shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in
Office.279
[the first of these clauses, the “Congressional
Emoluments Clause”]
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And
no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall,
without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present,
Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King,
Prince, or foreign State.280 [the “Foreign Emoluments Clause”]
The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a
Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished
during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he
shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from
the United States, or any of them.281 [the “Domestic Emoluments
Clause”]

A.

Wooden Communicative Originalism

Many of the arguments in litigation over the Emoluments
Clauses follow the wooden early version of communicative
originalism. President Trump cites period dictionaries to assert
that “emolument” means a “profit arising from an office or employ”
and therefore cannot apply to business transactions.282 In
particular, he notes that the Oxford English Dictionary lists his
proposed definition first and that it “lists each definition in the
order it appeared in the English language to ‘illustrate the word’s
development over time.’ ”283 He also argues that the definition
properly follows from the etymology of “emolument,” which derives
from the labor of earning a payment or profit for grinding corn.284

279

Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
281
Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
282
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 28,
Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174
(S.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 17 Civ. 458 (RA)).
283
Defendant’s Reply in Support of His Motion to Dismiss at 21, Citizens for
Responsibility and Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)
(No. 17 Civ. 458 (GBD)).
284
Id.
280
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Critics cite definitions from a broader group of English
language dictionaries from 1604 to 1806 to argue that
“emoluments” means any profit, gain or advantage.285 They
conclude that the Emoluments Clauses forbid the President to
receive any profit, gain, or advantage from federal, state or foreign
governments, including any direct or indirect profits from those
governments patronizing the Trump International Hotel in
Washington, D.C.286 Critics provide a statistical analysis of each
usage in the dictionaries, ranging from 92.5% using “profit” and
82.5% using “advantage” to only 7.5% using “employ” or “office.”287
They show further that every dictionary definition used one or
more of “profit,” “advantage,” “gain,” or “benefit,” and that over
92% of them exclusively defined “emolument” in those terms.288
Therefore, they conclude that the public meaning of “emolument”
at adoption was broad: any “profit” or “gain.”289 “[W]hen a
narrower meaning was intended, it was accompanied by
[restrictive] language” such as “of the offices” or “annexed to their
offices.”290
Critics also attack the dictionaries that the President relies
on. First, they argue that there is little, if any, evidence that those
dictionaries “were owned, possessed, or used by the founders, let
alone had any impact on them or on those who debated and ratified
the Constitution.”291 “By contrast, all of the dictionaries that the
founding generation did possess and use regularly define
‘emolument’ in the broad manner favoring the plaintiffs: ‘profit,’
‘advantage,’ or ‘benefit.’ ”292 Second, “Trusler’s volume is not a
standard dictionary, but rather a thesaurus, which presumes that
285
Brief of Amicus Curiae by Certain Legal Historians on Behalf of Plaintiffs at
25, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174
(S.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 17 Civ. 458 (GBD)) [hereinafter “Legal Historians”].
286
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 6,
32, 52, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174
(S.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 17 Civ. 458 (GBD)).
287
John Mikhail, The Definition of “Emolument” in English Language and Legal
Dictionaries, 1523–1806, A-5 (Aug. 4, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2995693).
288
Id. at 8.
289
See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss,
supra note 286, at 35.
290
Id. at 36 (quoting John Mikhail, A Note on the Original Meaning of
“Emolument”, BALKANIZATION (Jan. 18, 2017), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/01/anote-on-original-meaning-of-emolument.html (listing examples from the Federalist
Papers)).
291
Legal Historians, supra note 285, at 2.
292
Id. at 3.
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‘gain,’ ‘profit,’ and ‘emolument’ are synonyms; moreover, its
explanation of ‘emolument’ was copied directly from a French
thesaurus, hence it is not even reliably grounded in English
usage.”293 Third, “emolument” cannot be a term of art with the
President’s asserted narrow meaning because it was not a defined
term in the most significant common law dictionaries from 1523 to
1792; they merely use the word in other definitions.294
The President retorts that period lexicographers may have
copied each other’s definitions.295 Moreover, they did not and could
not systematically discern all meanings of words.296 Finally, their
dictionaries “were generally more prescriptive about how
language should be used, rather than descriptive of how it was
actually used at the time.”297
Ellesmere’s attack on the novel interpretive method
demonstrates the futility of the wooden originalist approach.
Period dictionaries include a wide range of inconsistent
definitions, none of which can provide a non-normative original
public meaning of the term “emoluments” in the Constitution.
Indeed, by asserting that lexicographers did not and could
not discern all meanings of words, the President undercuts the
case for adopting his dictionary-based narrow meaning of
“emoluments.”
Etymologies are even less useful. The President relies on one
reference work that provides a narrow definition tied to labor in
an office or employ.298 However, another etymological dictionary
defines “emolument” as “profit gotten properly by grist, or
whatever is ground at the mill: hence used to signify any
advantage, or gain.”299 Indeed, the phrase “to bring grist to the
(one’s) mill” has been used since 1583 to mean “to bring business
to one’s hands; to be a source of profit or advantage.”300 One
important use in the founding-era context of debates over public
trust was the exact opposite of the President’s interpretation:
emoluments for doing no work at all, including gratuitous
293

Id.
Id. at 4.
295
Def.’s Reply Mot. Dismiss, supra note 283, at 20.
296
Id.
297
Id. (emphasis omitted).
298
Id. at 21.
299
Emoluments, ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY; OR A DERIVATIVE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE IN TWO ALPHABETS (London, George William Lemon ed., 1783).
300
Grist, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, def. 2.c (2019), https://www.oed.com/
view/Entry/81626?rskey=TYrzeD&result=2#eid.
294
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emoluments301 and emoluments for no-show jobs.302 Etymologies
are vain and comical ornaments for judicial opinions and traps for
the unwary. They cannot provide constitutional meanings.
The litigation over the Emoluments Clauses demonstrates
that wooden communicative originalism has not overcome the
challenges that original intent originalism faced. One cannot
determine a factual meaning by counting dictionary votes any
more than “intention-votes.”303 Dictionaries, thesauruses, and
other reference works cannot capture all meanings of words. The
choice of a particular word does not necessarily communicate its
original etymological meaning, and the order in which a usage
appeared cannot determine the word’s communicative content at
a time when other uses have arisen.
There is no way to determine as a matter of fact whether to
charge adopters with the meaning of the words that they choose,
regardless of whether they have read all extant dictionaries, or
instead to charge their audience with knowing the definitions in
the dictionaries that the adopters actually read. And in the latter
case, it is not possible to determine as a matter of fact how to
determine a single meaning if different adopters have read
different dictionaries. Dictionary definitions are facts. The text of
the Constitution is a fact. But the communicative content of
constitutional text is not a fact.
B. Sophisticated Communicative Originalism
Seth Barrett Tillman, Robert G. Natelson, and two teams of
linguistics scholars have offered sophisticated originalist
interpretations of the Emoluments Clauses. This Part considers
their interpretations and provides counterarguments. It suggests
that their approaches cannot determine a non-normative public
meaning of the Clauses and further that they are better
understood as part of the latest evolution of originalism: original
law304 or original methods305 originalism. Stephen Sachs explains
that this newer version of originalism
isn’t just about recovering the meaning of ancient texts, a project
for philologists and historians. Instead, it’s about determining
the content of our law, today, in part by recovering Founding-era
301
302
303
304
305

See THE GENUINE LETTERS OF JUNIUS xv (London, 1771).
27 GREAT BRITAIN, THE PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER 618 (London, 1790).
Brest, supra note 1, at 212–13.
See Sachs, supra note 13, at 858, 875–76.
See, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 32, at 751.
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doctrine. That means learning some history, but it also means
exercising legal judgment, the kind we hire lawyers
for. . . . [O]riginalism is just ordinary lawyer’s work.306

1.

Seth Barrett Tillman’s Approach

Tillman writes that “our task is to understand what the
American public thought the meaning of” relevant text “was
between 1787 and 1790, the time period during which the original
thirteen states ratified the Constitution.”307 We should find
roughly contemporaneous evidence to determine the “probable or
likely public understanding of disputed constitutional text.”308
Tillman surveys the evidence and proposes narrow constitutional
meanings for “emoluments” generally and for offices “under” the
United States within the Foreign Emoluments Clause specifically.
a.

Office Under

Tillman asserts that the Foreign Emoluments Clause does not
apply to an elected office like the presidency because it is not an
“Office of Profit or Trust under” the United States.309 He argues
that the term is a legal term of art taken from the British “Office
under the Crown,” which did not reach elected positions.310 If he
is correct, then the president is exempt from the Foreign
Emoluments Clause but remains subject to the Domestic
Emoluments Clause.
306
Sachs, supra note 13, at 821–22 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 821 (“To
find out the law that the Constitution made, the relevant way to read the document’s
text would be according to the rules of the time, legal and otherwise, for turning
enacted text into law. If that version needs a label, we could call it ‘original-law
originalism’: the view that the Constitution should be read according to its original
legal content, whatever that might have been.”); cf. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note
32, at 752 (“[W]e argue that the premises underlying the two leading approaches to
originalism—original intent and original public meaning—lead, if properly
understood, to the view that the Constitution should be interpreted based on the
enactors’ original methods.”). But see, e.g., Whittington, supra note 15, at 389 (“The
originalist project is committed to uncovering, to the degree possible, the meaning of
the rule or principle that those who were authorized to create the Constitution meant
to communicate, not to making use of any particular form of constitutional
argument.”).
307
Seth Barrett Tillman, The Original Public Meaning of the Foreign Emoluments
Clause: A Reply to Professor Zephyr Teachout, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 180,
205 (2013).
308
Id. at 186 (footnote omitted).
309
Brief for Scholar Seth Barrett Tillman as Amicus Curiae in Support of the
Defendant at 13, Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp.
3d 174 (S.D.N.Y 2017) (No. 17 Civ. 458(RA)) (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 8).
310
Id. at 20.
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Zephyr Teachout identifies many public uses indicating that
the public understood “office under” to reach elected positions.311
Tillman responds that they are not probative because they either
predate the use of the term of art in the drafting of the
Constitution or post-date it so greatly that they reflect the loss of
understanding of the original meaning of such a precise term.312
There is some public usage supporting Tillman’s view that the
term did not reach the president.
In 1790, the former
Superintendent of the Finances of the United States described
that position as “the most important office under the
government,”313 which implies that he did not consider the
presidency to be an office under the United States. After Thomas
Jefferson’s election, an anonymous author called the Secretary of
State “the highest office under the government,”314 stated that
newly-appointed Secretary of State James Madison “found all the
offices under the general government exclusively in the possession
of federalists and tories,”315 and argued that President Jefferson’s
election “audibly declared, that a change was absolutely
necessary, not merely in the high elective offices of the
government, but also of those in its disposal.”316
However, other period uses included elected offices. The
Continental Congress entertained a motion in 1785 to disqualify
any member of Congress “from being elected by the United States
in Congress assembled, to any office of trust or profit, under the
said states.”317 And George Mason considered the president to be
subject to the Foreign Emoluments Clause.318

311

See Zephyr Teachout, Gifts, Offices, and Corruption, 107 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 30, 42–44, 46 & n.67 (2012).
312
See, e.g., Tillman, supra note 307, at 190–91; Seth Barrett Tillman, Either/Or:
Professors Zephyr Rain Teachout and Akhil Reed Amar – Contradictions and
Suggested Reconciliation 108 (Jan. 12, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1970909).
313
2 UNITED STATES, THE JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 23 (Martin P. Claussen ed.,
Michael Glazier, Inc. 1977) (1790).
314
THE REPUBLICAN CRISIS 9 (Alexandria, 1812).
315
Id. at 10.
316
Id.
317
28 UNITED STATES, JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at
388 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., U.S. Gov’t. Printing Office 1933) (1785).
318
See 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE
GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 484 (Philadelphia, J.B.
Lippincott Co. 1891).
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Tillman acknowledges that state law usage of “office under”
“seems akin to the Constitution’s,”319 and that usage included
election to offices under a state. St. George Tucker referred to both
election to “any office” and election to “any office under the
state” in his famous 1803 American edition of Blackstone’s
Commentaries.320 In addition, the 1819 Maine Constitution
referred to “every person elected . . . to any . . . office under this
State.”321
Popular usage also included elected offices. Accounts of the
Connecticut charter published by order of Congress referred to
both persons “elected to any office in the government” and persons
“elected to any office under Government.”322 The Pennsylvania
governorship was an elected position,323 and a 1789 news article
described a proposal to forbid the governor to “hold any other office
under this State.”324 A 1790 article referred to the governor as
holding an office under the state constitution,325 and in the same
year James Wilson, a founder and sitting United States Supreme
Court Justice, described the governor as holding an office under
Pennsylvania.326 A 1793 New York article refers even more
319

Tillman, supra note 312, at 63. He acknowledges that state law authorities are
not uniform, so they provide only some authority for his interpretation. Id. at 64.
320
See 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF
REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, pt. 1, app. at 184
(Philadelphia, William Young Birch & Abraham Small, 1803) (describing a Virginia
statute as requiring five years of residence “before any naturalized foreigner is capable
of being elected to any office under the state”); id. at pt. 2, 375 (describing the Virginia
statute as requiring five years residence “before any naturalized foreigner can be
elected or appointed to any office, legislative, executive, or judiciary”). The actual
statute utilizes the latter language. See Act of Oct. 11, 1786, reprinted in 12 THE
STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE
FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 262 (William Waller
Hening ed., Richmond, Va., J & G. Cochran 1823) (“[T]hey shall not be capable of
election or appointment to any office, legislative, executive, or judiciary, until an
actual residence in the state of five years . . . .”).
321
ME. CONST. art. 9, § 1 (1819).
322
THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE SEVERAL INDEPENDENT STATES OF AMERICA 51
(London, J. Stockdale 1782) (“elected to any office in the government”); THE
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE SEVERAL INDEPENDENT STATES OF AMERICA 135 (London, J.
Stockdale 1783) (“elected to any office under Government”).
323
PA. CONST. of 1790, art. II, § 2, reprinted in 12 SAMUEL HAZARD,
PENNSYLVANIA ARCHIVES 15 (Philadelphia, Joseph Severns & Co. 1856).
324
See GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES (New York), Dec. 26, 1789, at 294
(proposal in an earlier draft of the 1790 state constitution).
325
See GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES (New York), Sept. 22, 1790, at 603.
326
3 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON, L.L.D.
341–42 (Philadelphia, 1804) (speech in a 1790 Pennsylvania convention opposing the
incompatibility proposal).
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generally to persons “elected to any office under the government of
the state or of the United States.”327 In addition, a 1797 New York
newspaper article described an elected senator as holding “an
important office under the government of this state.”328
Other uses imply that elected executive offices are
offices under state and federal governments. Maryland’s 1776
Constitution provided that no person
holding any office under the united states, or any of them, or a
minister or preacher of the gospel of any denomination, or any
person employed in the regular land service, or marine, of this or
the united states, shall have a seat in the general assembly, or
the council of this state.329

Given the breadth of the disqualifications, it would be fanciful to
interpret “office under the united states, or any of them” to allow
holders of elected executive offices of other domestic governments
to sit in the Maryland general assembly or council.330 Moreover,
usage in the First Congress suggests that elected executive offices
are offices for purposes of every constitutional provision.
Representative Sedgwick described the vice president as “an
officer by the constitution,”331 and James Madison advised that
“[w]e are to consider his appointment as part of the
constitution.”332
Madison’s use of “appointment” for the elected position of vice
president counsels against drawing fine distinctions between
elected and appointed offices in public meaning constitutional
interpretation333 where the relevant provision does not include

327

THE DIARY; OR, LOUDON’S REGISTER (New York), Mar. 28, 1793, at 2.
OTSEGO HERALD (Cooperstown, N.Y.), Jan. 12, 1797, at 2.
329
MD. CONST. § 37 (1776), reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE SEVERAL
INDEPENDENT STATES OF AMERICA 111 (London, J. Stockdale 1782).
330
Tillman notes that Charles Carroll sat in both the Maryland and federal
Senates from 1789 to 1792. Tillman, supra note 307, at 199. This precedent suggests
that “office under” did not include elected legislative positions. But it is inapposite to
elected executive offices.
331
6 MATHEW CAREY, THE AMERICAN MUSEUM 19 (Philadelphia, 1789)
[hereinafter MUSEUM].
332
1 THOMAS HART BENTON, ABRIDGMENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS, FROM
1789 TO 1856, at 121 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1860) (debate of July 16, 1789).
333
Cf. JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 317, at 388 (motion
to disqualify any member of Congress “from being elected by the United States in
Congress assembled, to any office of trust or profit, under the said states”); Gen. Ct.
Mass. Res. 109, in ACTS AND LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 379
(Boston, Adams & Nourse 1783) (original proposal was to prohibit members from
being “appointed to any office, under the States”).
328
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either word.334 In 1789, the New York legislature referred to
George Washington’s “election to” and “appointment to” the
presidency in the same sentence.335 The governor and council of
North Carolina wrote to President Washington that his
“appointment to the first office in the union” would no doubt
accelerate the state’s ratification of the Constitution.336 And an
1801 New York article defended officeholders of the Clinton family
against charges of oligarchy by pointing out that they held elected
offices under the state constitution.337
Finally, Tillman provides no evidence that anyone in “the
American public”338 believed that “office under” was a term of art
for whose meaning they should defer to lawyers. He does not cite
a single public use in which anyone—Founder, drafter, ratifier, or
other—links the constitutional term and the British legal term.
This contrasts with the Constitution’s term “natural born,” for
example, which has numerous founding-era uses linked to British
uses of the term.339
How does Tillman conclude that “office under” incorporates
the British term of art despite significant contrary public usage
and the absence of public usage linking them? This Article
suggests that he exercises legal judgment to determine
founding-era doctrine—his originalism, like Sachs’s, “is just
ordinary lawyer’s work.”340

334

Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“appointed to any civil Office”).
MUSEUM, supra note 331, at 103.
336
Id. at 23.
337
See AM. CITIZEN AND GEN. ADVERTISER (New York), Aug. 21, 1801, at 2
(“[T]here is not a single one in the whole who holds an office under the state
constitution by appointment. George Clinton, esq., is elected governor, and DeWitt
Clinton, esq. is a senator, also by election.”).
338
See Tillman, supra note 307, at 205 (arguing that the goal is to determine
“what the American public thought the meaning of” relevant text was at the time of
the Constitution’s adoption).
339
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (presidential qualifications); John
Adams, Draft Articles to Supplement the Preliminary Anglo-American Peace Treaty,
NAT’L ARCHIVES (ca. Apr. 27, 1783) (art. 1), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Adams/06-14-02-0278 (1783 proposal to grant British subjects all of the rights “of
natural born Citizens” of the United States in exchange for Britain granting U.S.
citizens all of the rights of “natural born Subjects” of the crown); Virginia House
of Delegates, Bill for the Naturalization of Foreigners, NAT’L ARCHIVES (OCT. 14,
1776), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-01-02-0223 (Jefferson
substituting “natural born citizens” for “natural born Subjects” in 1776 draft
legislation).
340
See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
335
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Tillman acknowledges “that historical context matters,” but
he insists that “legal context is . . . a very substantial element” of
it.341 He rejects the interpretation of Framers who believed, in a
related dispute, that a member of Congress holds an “office”
because they did not provide “a clear reasoned basis for their
views.”342 In determining the meanings of “office” and “office
under,” he relies on usual legal sources and analyses like
Supreme Court precedents;343 textual differences between the
Constitution and other legal documents, including the Articles of
Confederation;344 textual differences between alternative
proposals for the same constitutional provision;345 settled drafting
conventions;346 intratextual uniformity;347 incongruity of results
from applying an interpretation to other constitutional provisions
that use the same term;348 period treatises;349 deference to statutes
enacted by the First Congress;350 and practices of federal officials
shortly after the adoption of the Constitution.351
In the related constitutional dispute, Tillman ultimately
refers to “the fact (or, better, the legal conclusion) that members of
Congress” do not hold an “office.”352 He reaches a legal conclusion;
he does not prove a fact about the meaning of the word. The
strength of his argument regarding “office under” relies on legal
analysis, not on any evidence that the American public thought
that the Constitution incorporates a British term of art that
excludes elected offices. His argument would not suffer at all if
the British term and practice never existed. Tillman inclines
toward Ellesmere’s reliance on a legal interpreter’s learning and
depth of reason over Bacon’s appeal to common understanding.

341

Seth Barrett Tillman, The Foreign Emoluments Clause—Where the Bodies Are
Buried: “Idiosyncratic” Legal Positions, 59 S. TEX. L. REV. 237, 247 (2017).
342
Tillman, supra note 307, at 194.
343
See, e.g., id. at 198; Tillman, supra note 312, at 59 n.103.
344
See Tillman, supra note 307, at 195–96.
345
See id. at 205.
346
See id. at 196.
347
See Tillman, supra note 312, at 52.
348
See, e.g., Tillman, supra note 341, at 244, 265.
349
See id. at 269–70.
350
See Tillman, supra note 312, at 59 & n.103 (interpreting “office under” to
include elected offices would make a statute enacted in the First Congress
unconstitutional based on the Federalist 60 and a 1969 Supreme Court decision).
351
See Tillman, supra note 307, at 187–88, 199–200.
352
Tillman, supra note 312, at 48 (emphasis omitted).
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Definition of Emoluments

Tillman asserts that “emolument” meant only “the lawfully
authorized compensation that flows from holding an office or
employment.”353 Consequently, the Foreign Emoluments Clause,
for example, precludes “U.S. officers from taking emoluments
associated with foreign government positions, foreign government
offices, and foreign government employments (e.g., civil service
positions).”354 Tillman relies on three principal grounds to assert
this narrow public meaning of the word. The first is the Supreme
Court’s 1850 statement in Hoyt v. United States that the word
emoluments “embrac[es] every species of compensation or
pecuniary profit derived from a discharge of the duties of the
office.”355 The second is that “emoluments” must be limited to the
lawfully authorized compensation from holding office or
employment because unlawful payments, such as those that might
be routed through business transactions, are something
completely different—bribes. More specifically, “bribes are illegal,
and are an enumerated ground for impeachment under Article II,
Section 4. Emoluments are lawfully authorized . . . . The two are
mutually exclusive and governed by different constitutional
provisions.”356 The third is that the narrow definition must be
correct because the broad definition of any profit, gain, or
advantage would prevent a covered official from receiving any
benefit in states or foreign countries such as marriage, divorce,
and judicial enforcement of personal rights.357
Tillman’s definition is superficially unsatisfactory. The
Foreign Emoluments Clause specifically forbids accepting foreign
offices.358 There is no reason to forbid accepting the compensation
of foreign offices when the clause prohibits accepting the offices in
the first place; nor is there any reason to forbid accepting the
compensation of foreign government employment when the clause

353

Brief for Tillman, supra note 309, at 5 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 6.
355
51 U.S. 109, 135 (1850), quoted in Brief for Tillman, supra note 309, at 5.
356
Brief for Tillman, supra note 309, at 7 (emphasis omitted).
357
See Seth Barrett Tillman, Part VI: DC & MD v Trump—Can the
President of the United States get Married or Divorced?, NEW REFORM CLUB (Mar. 20,
2019, 6:34 AM), http://reformclub.blogspot.com/2019/03/part-vi-dc-md-v-trumpcanpresident-of.html.
358
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“[N]o Person holding any Office of Profit or
Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of
any . . . Office . . . from any King, Prince, or foreign State.”).
354
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could simply prohibit accepting employment as it does offices.359
Moreover, Tillman’s definition creates an unjustified distinction
between employees and “independent” contractors. It forbids
holding a military procurement job in another government’s civil
service,360 for example, but allows holding a contract to procure the
same weaponry for the same government (as well as holding
employment with that same contractor).
In fact, period usage of “emoluments”—including legal
usage—is far broader than Tillman’s definition and supports
interpreting the Domestic and Foreign Emoluments Clauses to
include business transactions with governments.
i.

Broader Public, Governmental, and Legal Usage

Founding-era uses of “emolument(s)” included unlawful,361
unwarrantable,362 and gratuitous363 benefits of individuals as well
as benefits of non-natural persons that do not hold office or
employment such as “[t]he church of England,”364 the Bank of
England,365 and “the united States in congress assembled.”366 In
the context of government, gratuitous emoluments were
359
See Victoria Nourse, Reclaiming the Constitutional Text from Originalism: The
Case of Executive Power, 106 CAL. L. REV. 1, 29 (2018); cf., e.g., MD. CONST. § 37
(1776), reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE SEVERAL INDEPENDENT STATES OF
AMERICA 111 (London, J. Stockdale 1782) (forbidding jointly holding specified
positions).
360
See Brief for Tillman, supra note 309, at 6 (prohibition applies to civil service
jobs as well as government offices).
361
See infra note 403 and accompanying text.
362
See infra note 415 and accompanying text; GREAT BRITAIN, supra note 302, at
329 (“unwarrantable emoluments” taken by troops posted too far away to
be controlled).
363
See supra note 301 and accompanying text. “Emoluments” included gratuities
provided by more than just one’s employer. See 3 GREAT BRITAIN, REPORT RELATIVE
TO THE MANNER OF PASSING THE ACCOUNTS OF THE CUSTOMS, IN THE OFFICE OF THE
AUDITORS OF THE IMPREST 247 (1785) (“His other Emoluments are customary
Gratuities from the Company . . . and from the Passengers upon their Baggage being
discharged by Sufferance, and from the Officers for their Clearing Stores . . . .”).
364
See GREAT BRITAIN, supra note 302, at 154.
365
See An Act for Establishing an Agreement with the Governor and Company of
the Bank of England, for Advancing the Sum of Three Millions Towards the Supply
for the Service of the Year One Thousand Eight Hundred, 39 & 40 Geo. 3 c. 28,
§ 13 (1800).
366
See An Act to Vest the United States, in Congress Assembled, with Full Power
to Regulate Trade, and to Enter into Treaties of Commerce, 5 Acts of New Hampshire
105 (June 23, 1785), reprinted in 21 EARLY STATE PAPERS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 871
(Albert Stillman Batchellor ed., Concord, N.H. 1892) (providing that “all the fees
profits and emoluments, arising from such regulations of Trade and Treaties of
Commerce shall be appropriated to the sole use of discharging the public debt”).
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particularly subject to abuse.367 Other uses unrelated to labor in
an employment relationship included emoluments of trade and
commerce,368 the carrying business,369 markets,370 paper money
loans,371 conquests,372 battle,373 trades,374 labor generally,375
inventions,376 publications,377 theatrical performances,378 and
property including land,379 vineyards,380 wharves,381 and
buildings.382 In discussing the proposed Foreign Emoluments
Clause, George Mason pointed out that it would “be difficult to
know whether [the president] receives emoluments from foreign
powers or not.”383 That would not have been difficult in the
367
See 1 GREAT BRITAIN, THE REPORTS OF THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO
EXAMINE, TAKE, AND STATE THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTS OF THE KINGDOM 111 (London,
1783) (“The remaining Head is that of Gratuities; a Species of Emolument very liable
to Abuse . . . The Public Voice unites with that of Individuals, in demanding a
Suppression of a Species of Emolument so easily perverted to Purposes injurious to
the Interest of both.”).
368
15 THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 550 (1907) (Journal of
the Commons House, May 1780).
369
3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 345 (Philadelphia, 2d ed., 1836) (James
Madison in the Virginia ratifying convention).
370
4 CALENDAR OF TREASURY BOOKS AND PAPERS 509 (1901) (Dec. 3, 1741:
farmers’ market).
371
Pennsylvania Assembly Committee, Report on the Governor’s Instructions,
NAT’L ARCHIVES (Sept. 23, 1756), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/
01-06-02-0234.
372
THE RIGHT HON. EARL T—MPLE, AN ANSWER TO A LETTER TO THE RIGHT
HONOURABLE THE EARL OF B*** 27 (London, 1761).
373
John Thomas, Letter from Major General John Thomas to George Washington,
NAT’L ARCHIVES (May 8, 1776), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/
03-04-02-0193.
374
3 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 276–77 (Dublin, 1776).
375
THOMAS CLARKSON, AN ESSAY ON THE SLAVERY AND COMMERCE OF THE
HUMAN SPECIES 75 (Philadelphia, 3d ed. 1787).
376
JAMES RUMSEY, A SHORT TREATISE ON THE APPLICATION OF STEAM 1035 note
(Philadelphia, 1788).
377
1 THE COMPANION TO THE PLAY-HOUSE (London, 1764) (within entry for
“The Mistakes”).
378
Id. (within entry for “Love-a-la-Mode”).
379
See Act of Oct. 10, 1785, reprinted in 12 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A
COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE
LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 262 (William Waller Hening ed., Richmond, Va.,
G. Cochran 1823) [hereinafter Compact].
380
10 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 8726 (Edinburgh, 2d ed., 1783).
381
See Compact, supra note 379, art. 1, § 7.
382
See 2 SUFFOLK DEEDS 41 (Boston, Rockwell & Churchill 1883) (1654
indenture).
383
ELLIOT, supra note 318, at 484.
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founding era if “emoluments” meant only lawful payments that the
president received for personal employment by the foreign
governments.
In the context of government, business contracts and their
benefits were emoluments that people recognized were subject to
abuse and threatened the survival of representative government.
Benjamin Franklin noted a taxpayer’s objection to wasteful
government spending on “Pensions, Salaries, Perquisites,
Contracts and other Emoluments,” presumably because the
recipients belonged to a different political party.384 George
Washington lamented the harm that the “Emolument of the
Contractors” caused to the American army.385 As early as 1771,
British reformers criticized the grant of “places, pensions,
contracts, and other emoluments” to members of the House of
Commons,386 recognized that those conflicted recipients could not
“do their duty to the people,”387 and proposed legislation to require
“that any member who receives a place, pension, contract, lottery
ticket or any other emolument whatsoever, from the crown, or
enjoys profit from any such place, pension, &c., shall not only
vacate his seat, but be absolutely ineligible during his continuance
under such undue influence.”388
More ominously, John Adams warned in 1788 that
emoluments such as government contracts could lead to the
republic’s downfall in his famous A Defence of the Constitutions of

384
See Benjamin Franklin, From Benjamin Franklin to Mary Stevenson, NAT’L
ARCHIVES (Sept. 2, 1769), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-1602-0110.
385
See George Washington, From George Washington to Robert Morris, NAT’L
ARCHIVES (June 16, 1782), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/9901-02-08703 (contractors’ tenacious defense of their contractual emoluments
responsible for “the present deplorable state of the Magazines and the dangerous
consequences which may flow from it”); cf. George Washington, From George
Washington to James McHenry, NAT’L ARCHIVES (Dec. 13, 1798), https://founders.
archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-22-02-0184 (contractors’ primary focus on their
own profit tends to lead them to supply inferior materials at the wrong location in the
wrong quantities and thereby “to defeat the best concerted military plans”).
386
An Historical Essay on the English Constitution, 41 THE GENTLEMAN’S AND
LONDON MAGAZINE: OR, MONTHLY CHRONOLOGER, 399, 685 (Dublin, 1771).
387
Reports from the Supporters of the Bill of Rights, 41 THE GENTLEMAN’S AND
LONDON MAGAZINE: OR, MONTHLY CHRONOLOGER, 491, 491 (Dublin, 1771).
388
Id. at 492. State lotteries were a major source of revenue for the government
and were widely criticized as socially harmful. See, e.g., James Raven, The Abolition
of the English State Lotteries, 34 HIST. J. 371, 371–73 (1991); ANON., LONDON: A
SATIRE 23 (London, J. Stockdale 1787).
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Government of the United States of America.389 The majority might
“bestow all offices, contracts, privileges in commerce, and other
emoluments” on their supporters “and throw every vexation and
disappointment in the way of” their opponents until they
controlled the entire government.390 “The press, that great barrier
and bulwark of the rights of mankind,” would no longer be free.391
If its writers and printers accepted the hire that the majority
offered, they would become “vehicles of calumny against the
minority, and of panegyric and empirical applauses of the leaders
of the majority.”392 If not, they would be denounced and ruined.393
“In one word, the whole system of affairs, and every conceivable
motive of hope and fear, will be employed to promote the private
interests of a few, and their obsequious majority: and there is no
remedy but in arms.”394 Adams’s Defence was well known in the
United States.395
His message was so powerful that
Representative Livingston read that section of the Defence aloud
in the House of Representatives as an example of “how a
Government, organized like ours, may come to destruction” when
opposing the Adams administration’s Sedition Act,396 and Joseph
Story quoted it in his Commentaries.397
Adams’s warning
398
resonates today.
389
3 JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 284–85 (London, J. Stockdale 1788).
390
Id. at 284.
391
Id. at 285.
392
Id.
393
Id.
394
Id.
395
See, e.g., The Right Constitution of a Commonwealth Examined, GAZETTE OF
THE UNITED STATES (New York), July 22, 1789, at 116 (referencing this portion of
the Defence).
396
2 UNITED STATES, THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED STATES 2154–55 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1851) (debates in July 1798);
cf. 4 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 557 (Washington, 2d ed. 1836) (remarks in
support of the Virginia Resolutions of 1798, insinuating that Federalists were
“distributing emolument among devoted partizans . . . and deluding the people with
professions of republicanism”).
397
2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 31–32 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833).
398
See, e.g., Ken Klippenstein, $300M Puerto Rico Recovery Contract Awarded to
Tiny Utility Company Linked to Major Trump Donor, DAILY BEAST (Oct. 24, 2017),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/dollar300m-puerto-rico-recovery-contract-awardedto-tiny-utility-company-linked-to-major-trump-donor; Sean Illing, How Fox News
Evolved into a Propaganda Operation, VOX (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.vox.com/
2019/3/22/18275835/fox-news-trump-propaganda-tom-rosenstiel; Mark Follman,
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Even in Tillman’s preferred legal context, authorities included
broad characterizations of business receipts as emoluments,
including emoluments of trading stocks,399 and of owning a ship,400
school,401 or intellectual property.402
More specifically, the
Emoluments Clauses limit the receipt of emoluments, so the most
apposite period authorities are ones that also limited their receipt.
Those authorities also used “emoluments” broadly.
A 1789 statute, the “Treasury Act,” forbade Treasury
Department officers to take “any emolument or gain for
negotiating or transacting any business in the said department,
other than what shall be allowed by law.”403
The word
“emolument” encompassed receipts from all sources and
unauthorized receipts. The statute used two qualifiers to refer to
the lawfully authorized compensation of the employment
relationship: “allowed by law” and “for negotiating or transacting
any business in the said department.”404
A 1795 statute
establishing the position of Purveyor of Public Supplies contained
a similar provision.405
A 1796 statute authorized the president to appoint agents to
trade on behalf of the United States and forbade the agents, their
clerks, and their employees to “take, or apply to his or their own
use, any emolument or gain for negotiating or transacting any
business or trade, during their agency or employment, other than
is provided by this act.”406 The word “emolument” encompassed
business and trade receipts of both persons who had a legal
relationship with the United States—the appointed agents—and

Trump Continues Stirring Dangerous Hatred of the Media, MOTHER JONES
(Mar. 10, 2019), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/03/trump-continuesdangerous-attacks-on-media-fake-news-threats/ (denouncing the opposing press as
“the true Enemy of the People”).
399
See Morris v. Langdale, 2 Bos. & Pul. 284, 284–85, 126 Eng. Rep. 1284
(C.P. 1800).
400
See Grigg v. Stoker, Forrest, 4, 5, 145 Eng. Rep. 1095, 1095 (Ex. 1800).
401
See Glazebrook v. Woodrow, 8 T. R. 366, 368, 101 Eng. Rep. 1436, 1438
(K.B 1799).
402
See Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2358, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 231 (K.B. 1769).
403
An Act to Establish the Treasury Department, ch. 12, § 8, 1 Stat. 65, 67
(1789). For a more detailed analysis of this statute, see infra notes 539–541 and
accompanying text.
404
Id.
405
See An Act to Establish the Office of Purveyor of Public Supplies, ch. 27, § 2, 2
Stat. 419, 419 (1795).
406
An Act for Establishing Trading Houses with the Indian Tribes, ch. 13,
§§ 2–3, 1 Stat. 452, 452 (1796).
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those who had none—their clerks and employees.407 The statute
required the qualifying clauses “for negotiating or transacting any
business or trade” to tailor the word’s scope to receipts from
specified transactions and “other than is provided by this act” to
restrict its scope to lawfully authorized receipts.408 An 1806
statute contained similar provisions.409
All of these statutes imposed duties of good faith and used
qualifiers to narrow the broad scope of the word “emoluments.”
The text of the Emoluments Clauses demonstrates the effect of
qualifiers. The Congressional Emoluments Clause applies to an
“Office . . . the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased.”410
The qualifier “whereof” is necessary to restrict the broad meaning
of “emoluments” to those of the office. The Domestic and Foreign
Emoluments Clauses do not contain any such qualifier, so respect
for the text requires them to apply more expansively. Tillman
acknowledges that prepositions like “of” have meaning in
constitutional interpretation.411 Similarly, he argues that “office”
alone has a broader constitutional meaning than “office under”
because “modifying phrases like under the United States work a
limitation on what would otherwise be the more expansive
category, office, unmodified.”412
Other authorities prohibited or voided the receipt of
emoluments in the more expansive sense of the word and generally
imposed duties of good faith. A 1779 Virginia statute recognized
that many tax collectors had misapplied tax revenues for “private
purposes in speculative bargains for the emolument of themselves
or their friends” to the detriment of the public, and in response
imposed forfeitures on any who did so in the future.413
A 1780 Virginia statute required certain officials to swear an
oath that “I will not, directly or indirectly, by myself, or any person
or persons whatsoever, dispose or make use of such [public] money,
407

See id.
Id.
409
See An Act for Establishing Trading Houses with the Indian Tribes, ch. 48, § 6,
1 Stat. 402, 403 (1806) (including a qualifier “excepting for or on account of the United
States,” demonstrating that the word “emolument” encompassed receipts for
non-employees such as the United States itself).
410
See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 2.
411
See Tillman, supra note 312, at 54.
412
See id. at 76 (footnote omitted).
413
An Act to Prevent the Misapplication of the Money Collected for Taxes, ch. 38,
§ 1 (1779), reprinted in 10 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619,
at 199 (William Waller Hening ed., Richmond, Va., G. Cochran 1822).
408
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or any part thereof, for my own emolument, or the emolument of
any other person, for private purposes, other than my legal
commission . . . .”414
A 1755 British statute recognized the distress suffered by
retired veterans who received their pensions in arrears and
consequently had to borrow in advance from lenders who imposed
“terms many times oppressive and usurious, to the extreme
detriment of” the pensioners “and to the unwarrantable
emoluments of” the lenders.415 Parliament voided all of the
pensioners’ existing and future assignments, contracts, and
security for monies to become due,416 and accelerated payment of
their pensions.417
A 1797 British statute limited the types of businesses that
could hold licenses to sell liquor and provided that “any license
which shall be granted to any person . . . having any interest,
emolument, or profit in or out of any other trade or
business . . . shall be, and the same is hereby declared null and
void” and imposed penalties on those whose licenses were so
voided.418
Finally, British reformers succeeded in enacting a standalone
statute in 1782 specifically forbidding the receipt of the
emoluments of government contracts in order to prevent conflicts
of interest and ensure the survival of representative
government.419 These authorities demonstrate that period legal
restrictions used “emoluments” broadly.
ii.

Conflicts of Interest

Tillman asserts an unnecessary dichotomy between bribery
and lawful employment compensation. Emoluments create issues
other than bribery, including issues of good faith involved in the
414
An Act to Empower the High Sheriffs to Proceed in a Summary Way Against
their Deputies, and for Other Purposes, ch. 11 § 4 (1780), reprinted in 10 THE
STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE
FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 256 (William Waller
Hening ed., Richmond, Va., G. Cochran 1822).
415
An Act for the Relief of the Out-Pensioners of the Royal Hospital at Chelsea,
28 Geo. 2 c. 1, pmbl. (1755).
416
See id. at § 1.
417
See id. at § 2.
418
An Act for Regulating the Issuing of Licenses for the Sale of Wine, Ale, Beer,
Cider, and Spirituous Liquors by Retail, and for Preventing the Immoderate Use of
Spirituous Liquors, 37 Geo. 3 c. 45, § 7 (1797).
419
See infra Section VI.B.2.b; infra note 511 and accompanying text (prohibition
required to prevent the ruin of Britain and to secure its constitution in the future).
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statutes from 1755 to 1806 described above.420 In particular, the
1782 reform statute discussed in Section VI.B.2.b below prohibited
emoluments from honest business transactions with government,
even though they were not bribes, because they create conflicts of
interest that threaten public trust and the survival of
representative government.
iii. Purposive Interpretation
Tillman also asserts an unnecessary dichotomy between the
critics’ broad definition and his narrow one, as Randy E. Barnett
does between broad and narrow meanings of “commerce.” There
is no objective reason to require an interpreter to choose between
two historical proper definitions or to require judges to create their
own proper definitions and defend them in all conceivable
contexts.
The authorities described above used “emoluments” broadly
to prevent conflicts of interest and ensure public trust. Hoyt
analyzed acts of Congress involving specific types of compensation
for a particular government official.421 The Court determined the
reach of the term “emoluments” based on “the obvious import of it
in these acts.”422 The opinion did not provide an exclusive
definition of the term, but instead explained the use to which
particular statutes put it.
Another nineteenth-century decision, Queen v. PostmasterGeneral,423 interpreted the term even more narrowly than Hoyt
based on statutory purpose. Expense reimbursements were
generally considered to be emoluments.424 One statute at issue in
Hoyt imposed a cap on “the annual emoluments of any collector of
the customs, after deducting therefrom the expenditures incident
to his office.”425 Congress used “emoluments” broadly and
expressly allowed collectors to deduct expenses from their
emoluments before applying the cap. The statute at issue in

420

See supra notes 403–409, 413–418 and accompanying text.
Legal Historians, supra note 285, at 20 n.72.
422
Hoyt v. United States, 51 U.S. 109, 135 (1850).
423
47 L.J.R. 435 (Eng. Q.B. 1878) (Bramwell, L.J.).
424
Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of “Emoluments” in the
Constitution, 52 GA. L. REV. 1, 15 (2017) (noting the term was generally included in
definition 1 unless implicitly excluded by separate enumeration in certain variants);
id. at 15–16 (noting that definition 2 generally includes all items in definition 1).
425
An Act to Amend “An Act to Establish the Compensations of the Officers
Employed in the Collection of the Duties on Imports and Tonnage; and for Other
Purposes”, ch. 37, § 3, 2 Stat. 316 (1802) (setting the compensation of customs officers).
421
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Postmaster-General granted terminated officers an annuity equal
to a proportion of “the annual Emolument derived by him from his
Office” as “Compensation for the Loss of his Office.”426 This statute
did not expressly provide for deducting reimbursed expenses. A
terminated officer sought to include his travel expense allowance
in calculating his annuity, but the Court refused, interpreting
“emoluments” more narrowly based on the purpose of the
statute.427 As one judge opined:
I must say that the case is a very plain one. The object of the
statute was to indemnify a man from the loss of the emoluments
he derived from the office; I can use no other words. The next
question is, what is an emolument? . . . Surely you would first
deduct what he had to expend for travelling.428

Aquinas reminds us that we must consider the meaning to
which words are put.429 Statutes used a broad meaning of
“emoluments” when preventing conflicts of interest and ensuring
public trust. The statutes involved in Hoyt used a narrower
meaning to calculate the statutorily authorized compensation of a
particular officer while in office. And the statute at issue in
Postmaster-General used the term even more narrowly to calculate
statutorily authorized compensation for the loss of an office. There
were many period uses of “emoluments,” and the interpretive issue
is the meaning to which the Constitution puts the word. This is
one of purpose, not linguistics.
2.

Robert G. Natelson’s Approach

a.

Emoluments

Robert G. Natelson provides an even more elaborate
exposition of the original meaning of “emolument.” He surveys
eighteenth-century usage including etymology,430 dictionary
definitions,431 and a variety of what he characterizes as “official,”432
as opposed to “general,”433 uses of the word prior to the final
426

See Telegraph Act, 31 & 32 Vict. c. 110, § 8(7) (1868).
Postmaster-General, 47 L.J.R. at 435.
428
Id. (allowing the officer to include only the excess of his fixed expense
allowance over his actual travel expenses).
429
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
430
Natelson, supra note 424, at 18 n.68.
431
Id. (citing multiple period dictionaries).
432
Id. at 10; cf. id. at 19 (“My impression from the foregoing survey is that in
official discourse (as opposed to general discourse), Definition No. 1 was the most
common use and Definition No. 4 the least.”).
433
Id. at 18.
427
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ratification of the Constitution. He focuses on “official British and
American founding-era discourse”434 generally, and “British
parliamentary and American legislative records” specifically.435
He determines that the word had four possible definitions in
official usage at adoption: (1) “fringe benefits of financial value by
reason of public employment,” (2) “all compensation of financial
value by reason of public employment,” (3) “proceeds of financial
value from gainful activity,” and (4) “all benefits or advantages.”436
Using only materials from before May 29, 1790—the day the
thirteenth
state
ratified
the
Constitution—to
avoid
anachronism,437 Natelson analogizes to prior state laws and
constitutions,438 the Articles of Confederation,439 and American
and British political reform statutes because Americans and
Britons “were part of the same linguistic and social community” in
1787.440
He uses rules of legal construction, purposive
interpretation, and the rule of reason in considering the four
potential definitions.441 He considers the practical consequences
of the four potential definitions for what he calls the five “top-tier
value[s]” that “the constitution-makers” shared and used to make
the Constitution: public trust (anti-corruption), “republican
government (including citizen control), effective government, the
natural rights of individuals, and decentralization (federalism and
local and individual autonomy).”442
He notes that the Constitution’s five top-tier values
sometimes conflicted and argues that, when they did, the
constitution-makers balanced and compromised them rather than
elevating a single value over the others.443 He examines the
434

Id. at 10.
Id. at 12.
436
Id. at 13–19. Natelson acknowledges that each had variants, illustrating “how
inexact the word could be.” Id. at 13. One might argue that Natelson confounds
definition with designation—that his four “definitions” and their variants merely
represent a few of the many gains, advantages or profits that writers of the period
describe as emoluments. See infra notes 363–382 and accompanying text for the large
variety of uses, including “official” uses in statutes and legislative histories.
437
See Natelson, supra note 424, at 10–11.
438
See id. at 24.
439
See id. at 26.
440
Id. at 19.
441
See id. at 54 (“rules of legal construction, the historical events that necessitated
the Clause, the lack of historical events suggesting a broader interpretation, and the
fact that it was literally impossible to apply the fourth definition to any office holder
who served abroad”).
442
Id. at 8–9 (footnote omitted).
443
See id. at 9.
435

2019]

EVALUATING ORIGINALISM: COMMERCE AND EMOLUMENTS

739

practical consequences of each potential definition for minimizing
corruption,444 attracting capable people from the private sector to
government service,445 and minimizing the size of the federal
government.446
In particular, Natelson examines these values in the context
of the eighteenth-century British reform movement. He claims
that the reform movement focused on emoluments received by
reason of public service. “Reformers sought to save public money
by trimming” perquisites of public office and to “make the
government fairer and more effective by shifting compensation
away from” perquisites to salaries.447 He asserts that complaints
about financial proceeds from gainful activities “do not appear” in
the reform movement,448 that the reforms were not radical but
instead were moderate, with other values tempering the reform
fervor,449 and that there were “no historical incidents that would
have induced the founders to apply a construction that included
honest business transactions or other” emoluments from gainful
activities.450
Natelson asserts that the founding generation would have
reasoned that the top-tier value of effective government requires
the services of people who “have proven their mettle in the private
sector” and who will find government service attractive.451 “A
wealthy merchant might be an asset to Congress even if his
attention was occasionally diverted from federal affairs to his own
private concerns.”452 Such people will need assurances that
government service will not ruin them by forbidding them to
benefit from government transactions.453 For example, “everyone
knew that tobacco growers were likely future candidates for the
444

See id. at 46.
See id. at 47–49.
446
See id.
447
Id. at 27.
448
See id. But see, e.g., infra notes 487–489 and accompanying text (the reform
movement deliberately targeted financial proceeds from honest business transactions
with government).
449
See Natelson, supra note 424, at 23–24. But see, e.g., infra notes 484–486 and
accompanying text (reform of business transactions with government was radical and
recognized as such at the time).
450
Natelson, supra note 424, at 53. But see, e.g., infra notes 505–509 and
accompanying text (a primary historical incident was the British prosecution of war
against America).
451
Natelson, supra note 424, at 31.
452
Id. at 32. But see, e.g., infra notes 508–511 and accompanying text (the issue
is conflict of interest, not inattention).
453
See Natelson, supra note 424, at 32, 49.
445
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presidency,” and forbidding the president to transact with state
governments would require tobacco growers to sell their land or
leave it fallow because several important states required tobacco
transactions to be conducted through state warehouses.454
Ultimately, Natelson argues that the written Constitution
resulted from this process of balance and compromise,455 that “the
final document crystalized the results,”456 and that “[i]t is
unfaithful to the Constitution for us to re-balance what the
framers and ratifiers have already adjusted.”457 He utilizes a
process of elimination to consider the four potential definitions and
concludes that the Constitution crystalized a narrow definition of
emoluments: “compensation with financial value received by
reason of public office, including salary and fringe benefits.
Proceeds from unrelated market transactions were outside the
scope of the term.”458 Natelson’s use of “crystalize” is noteworthy.
It is often used figuratively to mean “[t]o cause to become concrete
or fixed; to make clear and defined.”459 Natelson’s position is like
that of the 1608 novelists: we have a “certain known law” that we
must enforce without being subject to the “alterable discretion of
any judges.”460
Natelson’s approach is generally pluralist. It uses many of the
interpretive methods that Ellesmere identifies: historical,
definitional, etymological, analogical, and practical. It identifies a
broad scope for context. It is not restricted to American law, but
relies heavily on foreign law. In order to determine the meaning
of constitutional terms, the interpreter must consider British
social, political, and legal history, including specific British
statutes. Notably, by focusing on “official” uses of “emoluments”
and a full range of legal analysis, he follows Tillman in departing
from reliance on the ordinary public meaning of the word. The

454

See id. at 49. But see, e.g., infra notes 514–516 and accompanying text (the
reform movement considered but rejected an exception that would have allowed the
sale of produce of a member’s own estates).
455
See Natelson, supra note 424, at 9.
456
Id.
457
Id.
458
Id. at 55.
459
Crystallize, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, def. 3.a (2019), https://www.oed.
com/view/Entry/45399?redirectedFrom=crystallize#eid.
460
Case of the Union of the Realm of Scotland with England (1608), 2 How. St.
Tr. at 569 (Popham, C.J.).
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sources that Natelson relies on and the analyses that he conducts
are unlikely to be the grounds for how the American public
determined the meaning of “emoluments.”
Natelson’s approach requires the identification and balancing
of values that the Constitution does not enumerate or rank. It
requires the interpreter to identify and balance contending
fundamental principles considered in drafting and ratifying the
Constitution, including natural rights and federalism. It relies on
the rule of reason in considering the potential consequences of a
given definition for the five top-tier values.
This approach is consistent with coherence theories of
interpretation like that of Ronald M. Dworkin.461
An
interpretation should fit with the relevant legal materials and
provide a justification of them in a theory of political morality.462
This creates a strong role for political morality in legal
interpretation.
As a result, Natelson ultimately reasons
backwards like Barnett. The objective public meaning of the
constitutional text does not reveal the balance that the
constitution-makers struck. Rather, the balance that Natelson
believes they struck reveals the meaning of the text. Natelson’s
approach, like Barnett’s, is similar to a target of Michael Stokes
Paulsen’s criticism of pluralism: identifying an abstract principle
in the Constitution, assigning it a specific content based on the
interpreter’s own discernment, then infusing that content into
particular constitutional provisions.463
It is the opposite of Tillman’s approach, however. Tillman
requires one to “first tease out the precise metes and bounds of” a
clause before determining the significance of any principle
underlying it.464 Natelson appeals to underlying principles to
tease out the metes and bounds of the word “emoluments.” This
reflects the recurring issue in linguistic analysis of whether it is
possible to determine textual clarity as an independent fact
without knowing the speaker’s purpose.465

461

Cf. Kenneth J. Kress, Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin’s
Rights Thesis, Retroactivity, and the Linear Order of Decisions, 72 CAL. L. REV. 369,
370 (1984).
462
See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 246–47 (1986); Ronald Dworkin,
“Natural” Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165, 171 (1982); John C. Vlahoplus,
Understanding Dworkin, 1 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 153, 210–11 (1993).
463
See Paulsen, supra note 13, at 878–79.
464
Tillman, supra note 312, at 28.
465
See supra notes 141–143 and accompanying text.
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Natelson’s approach diverges from Dworkin’s in two features,
which reflect the core of originalism: an acute focus on history,
limiting consideration to materials from before May 29, 1790, and
a prohibition on interpreters using their own normative judgment
to identify and balance top-tier values. Natelson purports to
objectively identify founding-era values and the balance that the
constitution-makers struck.
Natelson’s approach is superficially unappealing. There is no
reason for the Foreign Emoluments Clause to forbid accepting the
compensation of foreign offices when the clause prohibits
accepting the offices in the first place.466 Natelson’s approach also
falls short on fit and the balancing of the purported top-tier values.
The top-tier value of saving the federal government money does
not justify the Foreign Emoluments Clause.
The Foreign
Emoluments Clause can only save foreign governments money.
The prohibition on states providing emoluments to the president
in the Domestic Emoluments Clause violates the top-tier value of
decentralization/federalism. Each state should be allowed to
determine how to spend its budget.467 Only the public trust value
justifies both of these prohibitions. Only assigning the public trust
value great weight justifies it outweighing the top-tier value of
decentralization/federalism in the Domestic Emoluments Clause.
In addition, Natelson arbitrarily limits the interpreter to
considering four definitions and using a process of elimination to
choose among them. As discussed above, there are many broader
official period uses of the word, including legal uses prohibiting or
voiding the receipt of emoluments interpreted broadly.468 There is
no need to limit a proposed constitutional definition of
“emoluments” to a single source of benefits. Just as Barnett
concludes
that
“commerce”
includes
navigation
and
transportation, so too might “emoluments” include both
compensation of an office and benefits derived from business

466

See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“[N]o Person holding any Office of Profit or
Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of
any . . . Office . . . from any King, Prince, or foreign State.”).
467
Natelson notes that on balancing grounds the Congressional Emoluments
Clause does not forbid members of Congress to hold state offices. See Natelson, supra
note 424, at 35–36. This respects decentralization and federalism. A general
prohibition on the president receiving emoluments from the states, however, can only
be justified on public trust grounds; otherwise the Constitution would allow each state
to determine whether it wanted to provide emoluments to the president, just as it
allows each state to determine whether members of Congress can hold state office.
468
See supra notes 403–409, 413–419 and accompanying text.
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transactions with government while in office—the specific target
of emoluments litigation against President Trump.
The
Anglo-American reform movement targeted the emoluments of
even honest business contracts with the government because they
created a conflict of interest and threatened public trust and the
survival of representative government.469 Crucially, the reform
movement targeted them because they caused Britain to protract
the war against the United States, impeding all efforts at peace.470
b.

Emoluments and the Reform Movement

The reform movement’s lessons are the opposite of those that
Natelson draws, specifically as they relate to business
transactions with government. Three principal reform examples
are the 1782 British Contractor’s Act, the 1789 Treasury Act, and
the 1808 American Public Contracts Act.
In 1782, after many years of reform agitation,471 Parliament
passed “An Act for restraining any Person concerned in any
Contract, Commission, or Agreement made for the Publick Service
from being elected or sitting and voting as a Member of the House
of Commons” (the “Contractor’s Act”).472 The prohibition was
“exceedingly popular” with the public because of their “general
odium” toward elected representatives who had business contracts
with the government.473 Section 1 of the act disqualified anyone
who enjoyed any “emolument arising from” a government contract
from sitting or voting in the House of Commons.474 Section 2
voided the seat of any member who violated the act,475 and Section
9 disqualified violators from ever receiving any “emolument” from
government contracts in the future.476

469

See infra notes 504–512, 389–394 and accompanying text.
See infra note 505 and accompanying text.
471
See, e.g., supra notes 386–388 (1771 complaints and proposals).
472
22 Geo. 3 c. 45 (1782).
473
See JOHN HUTTON, THE ANNUAL REGISTER, OR A VIEW OF THE HISTORY,
POLITICS, AND LITERATURE FOR THE YEAR 1778, at 176 (London, J. Dodsley eds.,
4th ed. 1800).
474
22 Geo. 3 c. 45, § 1 (1782).
475
See id. at § 2.
476
See id. at § 9.
470
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The act had only one purpose: “securing the freedom and
independence of Parliament.”477 An Albany newspaper reported in
1782 that the act would “purify the popular representation in
Parliament.”478 The act targeted conflicts of interest, not vote
trading or bribes.479 As David Hartley, M.P. wrote, “[t]he
greatness and dignity of this kingdom require that the constitution
of its Parliament should be not only uncorrupt, but
unsuspected.”480 The act applied to honest contracts,481 contracts
for the sale of produce of a member’s own estates,482 and contracts
for the exercise of a member’s own profession.483
The act easily passed the House of Commons but initially
faced stiff opposition in the House of Lords. Opponents recognized
that the act was radical. One characterized the bill’s supporters
as “mad from virtue” and insisted that the House of Lords had a
“duty to check and resist that delirium of virtue, that rage and
tempest of liberty, and bring them back to coolness and
sobriety.”484 Another asserted that proponents “were violently
bent on purifying” the House of Commons.485 One of the
Secretaries of State was himself almost delirious in opposition:

477
Id. at pmbl. At least one opponent of the Contractor’s Act recognized that it did
nothing to save the government money. See, e.g., 21 GREAT BRITAIN, THE
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 436–37 (London, Lord Chancellor ed. 1814)
(1780) (“[W]hat is the benefit to be derived to the state? None at all. The object of
œconomy is abandoned in the instant it is declared to be the only one; for it does not
pretend to put an end to corrupt contracts, because they may continue to be made as
formerly, but only to prevent the supposed influence arising from it in the other
House . . . .”). The British reform movement did seek to make government more
economical. However, Parliament enacted separate legislation to pursue that goal
while also further securing the independence of Parliament. See, e.g., An Act for
Enabling his Majesty to Discharge the Debt Contracted upon his Civil List Revenues;
and for Preventing the Same from Being in Arrear for the Future, by Regulating the
Mode of Payments out of the Said Revenues, and by Suppressing or Regulating
Certain Offices Therein Mentioned, Which are now Paid out of the Revenues of the
Civil List, 22 Geo. 3 c. 82, pmbl. (1782) (“for introducing a better . . . œconomy . . . and
for the better security of the liberty and independency of Parliament”); Archibald S.
Foord, The Waning of ‘The Influence of the Crown’, 62 ENG. HIST. REV. 484, 491 (1947);
Natelson, supra note 424, at 16 n.55 (describing subsequent legislation).
478
NEW-YORK GAZETTEER, OR, NORTHERN INTELLIGENCER (Albany, N.Y.), Oct.
28, 1782, at 1 (explanation by the Right Hon. Charles J. Fox, M.P.).
479
See infra notes 504–516 and accompanying text.
480
DAVID HARTLEY, TWO LETTERS FROM D. HARTLEY, ESQ. M.P. ADDRESSED TO
THE COMMITTEE OF THE COUNTY OF YORK 6 (London, J. Almon 1780).
481
See infra note 487 and accompanying text.
482
See infra note 488 and accompanying text.
483
See infra note 499 and accompanying text.
484
GREAT BRITAIN, supra note 477, at 417 (the Earl of Hillsborough).
485
Id. at 1390 (Colonel Onslow).
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A phrenzy of virtue, he said, began to shew itself in the House of
Commons. The people had run mad, and the infection was
gaining upon their representatives. It would therefore be the
duty of the Lords to interfere in their controuling capacity, to
stand in the gap, as he expressed himself, and to prevent the
other branch of the Legislature from adopting a reformation that
was only grounded on the visionary complaints of an over
pampered people.486

Opponents recognized that the act reached honest and fair
contracts,487 forbade sales of the produce of one’s own estates,488
and would either drive successful merchants out of service in the
House of Commons or cause them to give up their government
contracts and become economically dependent on the government
administration.489 Opponents made many of the same arguments
as Tillman, Natelson, and President Trump, including that
government service should be made attractive to those who are
successful in business490 and that the proposal was unnecessary
because other laws already policed impropriety in government
contracting.491
The opponents’ arguments are remarkably contemporary.
Lord Viscount Stormont argued that it was cruel and unjust “to
exclude merchants of great property, merely because they
happened to be engaged, fairly and openly, with government: for
unless proof was brought to the contrary, their Lordships must
486

THOMAS LEWIS O’BEIRNE, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE LAST SESSION OF
PARLIAMENT, WITH REMARKS 79 (London, J. Almon & J. Debrett eds., 1780). This may
have been the Earl of Hillsborough, who was a Secretary of State at the time. See Hill,
Wills, 1st Earl of Hillsborough [I] (1718–93), of North Aston, Oxon., HIST. OF
PARLIAMENT ONLINE, http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1754-1790/
member/hill-wills-1718-93 (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
487
See, e.g., 14 GREAT BRITAIN, THE PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER 218 (1802) (Lord
Viscount Stormont, 1779).
488
See, e.g., GREAT BRITAIN, supra note 477, at 1391 (Sir P.J. Clerke).
489
See, e.g., GREAT BRITAIN, supra note 487, at 219 (Lord Viscount Stormont);
GREAT BRITAIN, supra note 477, at 1390 (Colonel Onslow).
490
See, e.g., id. at 1392 (Sir P.J. Clerke) (“He wished to see merchants in that
House: he considered them as the most respectable men, when they came there
independent, with the virtuous intention of guarding the commercial welfare of the
kingdom.”); id. at 1390 (Colonel Onslow) (merchants were “one of the fittest
descriptions of people to sit in” the Commons); cf. GREAT BRITAIN, supra note 487, at
225 (Earl Bathurst) (“none but men of property and character were at all fitted for”
the trust of government contracts); supra notes 451–454 and accompanying text
(Natelson argument).
491
See, e.g., 5 ADAM ANDERSON, ANDERSON’S HISTORICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL
DEDUCTION OF THE ORIGIN OF COMMERCE, FROM THE EARLIEST ACCOUNTS 392
(Dublin, William Coombe 1790); GREAT BRITAIN, supra note 487, at 219; supra note
356 and accompanying text (Tillman argument).
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suppose that the contracts were fair and beneficial.”492 He argued
against laying “a general stigma, disgrace, and punishment” on
contractors without proof of their guilt,493 noting that if any
contract were “proved, at any time, to be founded in fraud and
imposition, the laws had already provided proper punishment for
public as well as private delinquency.”494 He hoped that the House
of Lords “would never give into the popular prejudice, that because
men enjoyed places of emolument and profit under government,
they were not left at liberty to act agreeable to their own
consciences but were rendered dependant on administration.”495
He acknowledged that an earlier Parliament had prohibited tax
gatherers from sitting in the House of Commons but opposed
extending that precedent because of the special circumstances of
that group: “[T]hey were in general needy men, and consequently
more liable to corruption.”496
The Earl of Hillsborough opposed the bill as unjust for
presuming that Members of Parliament would put their own
interests ahead of the nation’s.497 “Could their lordships imagine
that men of the first families and fortune in the country could be
so blind to the true interests of their families, and so insensible of
character, as to prefer the paltry consideration of a temporary
emolument to the welfare of their country?”498
Similarly, the Lord Chancellor attacked the proposal as
prejudiced for assuming that members would favor their own
interests over the nation’s, as overbroad, and as unjust for
indiscriminately denying members of the House of Commons the
right to honestly earn emoluments that the general public was
entitled to earn:
It would, besides, be an act of pre-judgment . . . . [T]he remedy
proposed was a general one, of constant, fixed, and extensive
operation; not pointed to this or that particular abuse, but a
general pretended reform . . . . Consider the matter again, in
respect of actual inconvenience; how pregnant with evil would
the present measure, if adopted, prove? And still more so, how
full of injustice? Here is a man . . . of considerable fortune, and
492
493
494

GREAT BRITAIN, supra note 487, at 218.
Id. at 219.
ANDERSON, supra note 491, at 392; see also GREAT BRITAIN, supra note 487,

at 219.
495
496
497
498

GREAT BRITAIN, supra note 487, at 219.
Id. at 218.
GREAT BRITAIN, supra note 477, at 417.
Id. at 418.
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engaged in great mercantile concerns; this man happens likewise
to be a member of the other House, and of course is in a situation
of a distinguished nature, because he is presumed to be acting for
the good of his country, and a sound presumption, till the
contrary be proved. But what says this Bill, but that the
man . . . must be . . . excluded from deriving from an honest and
fair pursuit and exercise of his profession, those emoluments
every person in the kingdom is intitled to, who does not stand in
the same predicament with himself. Such is the absurd idea the
Bill proceeds on, that the person thus engaged in the active
service of his country, is forbidden the advantages which, if not
engaged in that service, he might partake of in common with
others.499

Opponents argued in part from socio-economic prejudices.
Colonel Onslow asserted that merchants were “one of the fittest
descriptions of people to sit in” the Commons and that “he had
rather at any time sit down with a gentleman than with his
footman. If the Bill passed, all the respectable and wealthy men
would stay out of parliament, and they would send their servants
and dependents to that House.”500 He urged that those who
wanted to purify parliament should start by expelling those
members who were elected solely because of their oratory and who
had combined together in gangs with a lawyer at their head,
creating mischief and impeding government operations.501
Despite all of these objections, the Lords ultimately deferred
to the people. Proponents’ arguments in favor of the act are
remarkably contemporary as well. The Earl of Shelburne
characterized the opponents’ view cynically: “A noble earl had
said, that men would argue with themselves: ‘What, shall I be
base enough for the paltry consideration of a little dirty
emolument, to give up the interest of my country for my own?’ ”502
Shelburne insisted that the contractor would reason quite
differently: “What, shall I be silly enough to give up my own
interest, and the interest of my family and posterity for the empty
and nonsensical motives of public spirit, honour, and integrity?”503
Shelburne insisted that “Contracts were indisputably a great
temptation, and therefore he wished to put them out of the

499
500
501
502
503

Id. at 436 (Lord Chancellor).
Id. at 1390.
Id. at 1390–91.
Id. at 425.
Id.
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way of members of parliament.
For, notwithstanding the
declaration . . . that men of honour were superior to all influence
from contracts, human nature spoke a different language.”504
The conflict of interest inherent in government contracts
drove contractors in Parliament to support the war against the
United States. The Right Honourable Charles J. Fox explained
that British “ministers found it necessary to protract the war, to
avoid every tendency to pacification, because they knew that the
American war was necessary to their continuance in power.”505
Members of parliament who benefitted from “the emoluments of
contracts” accepted the ministers’ “monstrous and incredible”
assertions about the war506 and supported its continuation. A
leading minister had no doubt told “his friends, that their
payment, like his own bread, depended on the American war.”507
As Lord Shelburne further described the contractor’s
argument to himself:
Shall I vote for the conclusion of the present war when I am
making my fortune by its continuance? My vote, were I so
inclined, cannot do any great good. I could not gain the question
for my country. Why, then, should I be so inattentive to myself
as to overlook the present opportunity?508

The proposal offered both parliamentary independence and
the means for ending the American war. As David Hartley,
M.P. wrote:
Pensions, Places, exorbitant emoluments, sinecures, contracts,
and all such instruments of corruption for the purpose of
establishing a ministerial influence in Parliament, are
abominations at all times, but the greatest of all our evils now is
the continuation of the American war. The restoration of peace
with America, and of independence to Parliament, may go hand
in hand together . . . .509

The Contractor’s Act did not target bribery, dishonest
contracts, or classic trading of votes for benefits. It targeted
simple conflict of interest.510 As Hartley wrote in 1780 supporting
504

Id. at 425–26.
3 GREAT BRITAIN, THE PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER 436 (London, J. Debrett
1793) (1781).
506
Id.
507
Id.
508
GREAT BRITAIN, supra note 477, at 425.
509
HARTLEY, supra note 480, at 20.
510
This underlying purpose should resonate with Natelson. He notes its
application to the Impeachment Clause, under which “high misdemeanors encompass
505
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the proposal: “[N]o other remedy under Heaven, can rescue this
unhappy country from immediate ruin, or re-establish its future
constitution in security, but a FREE and INDEPENDENT
PARLIAMENT. The greatness and dignity of this kingdom require
that the constitution of its Parliament should be not only
uncorrupt, but unsuspected.”511
Parliament recognized that
government contracts created a conflict of interest even though
they did not guarantee a profit, as the American press reported.512
The risk that the conflict of interest posed was so great that
Parliament considered but rejected proposals to exempt contracts
awarded through public bidding513 and contracts for the sale of
produce of a member’s own estates.514 The latter proposal would
have enabled “Gentlemen to sell the growth of their own estates;
and thereby confining the disqualification to those middle men,
between the growers and manufacturers on the one part, and the
consumers on the other, who contract for the supply of
materials.”515 Some supported that proposed exemption because
“it would be exceedingly hard that such Gentlemen should be
deprived of the opportunity of serving the Public.”516 Despite the
concern for those gentlemen, Parliament rejected the proposed
exemption.
The Contractor’s Act was as radical as opponents
characterized it. It applied to anyone who received, in whole or in
part, any “emolument arising from” any government contract,
agreement, or commission for or on account of the public service,
whether directly, indirectly, in trust or on his behalf.517 It covered
contracts in effect at enactment and those that devolved upon
the member by descent, limitation or marriage, or as an

breaches of the duties of loyalty, good faith, and care.” Robert G. Natelson,
Impeachment: The Constitution’s Fiduciary Meaning of “High . . . Misdemeanors”,
19 FED. SOC. REV. 68, 72 (2018).
511
HARTLEY, supra note 480, at 6.
512
ROYAL AMERICAN GAZETTE (New York), July 23, 1782, at 2.
513
See, e.g., GREAT BRITAIN, supra note 477, at 417 (proposal in failed earlier draft
bill to exempt contracts awarded by public bidding).
514
ROYAL AMERICAN GAZETTE (New York), July 23, 1782, at 2; see also 14 TOWN
AND COUNTRY MAGAZINE 477–78 (London, A. Hamilton 1782).
515
ROYAL AMERICAN GAZETTE (New York), July 23, 1782, at 2; see also 14 TOWN
AND COUNTRY MAGAZINE 477–78 (London, A. Hamilton 1782).
516
ROYAL AMERICAN GAZETTE (New York), July 23, 1782, at 2; see also 14 TOWN
AND COUNTRY MAGAZINE 477 (London, A. Hamilton 1782).
517
An Act for Restraining any Person Concerned in Any Contract, Commission or
Agreement Made for the Publick Service from Being Elected or Sitting and Voting as
a Member of the House of Commons, 22 Geo. 3 c. 45, § 1 (1782).
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administrator, devisee, executor, or legatee.518 The act required
every government contract to contain an express condition
forbidding the admission of any member of the House of Commons
to it or to any of its benefits.519 It provided only one exception,
where a member benefitted indirectly through certain companies
and the contract was made “for the general benefit of such
incorporation or company.”520
The act’s remedial provisions were draconian. They voided
the seat of any member who violated the act.521 They penalized
violators the equivalent of one hundred thousand dollars per day
of improperly sitting in Parliament, plus costs,522 and disqualified
violators from ever receiving any “emolument” of a government
contract in the future.523 They fined the government’s signatory
the equivalent of one hundred thousand dollars plus costs.524
Finally, the act created a private right of action with monetary
bounties and no standing requirement in order to enforce its
provisions.525
Eighteenth-century appeals to the public trust principle were
broad. As one noted British economist wrote in 1772, people are
“apt to be blinded” by self-interest and willing to sacrifice the
public good to their own benefit; therefore “in all questions that
come before” legislatures, “it is absolutely necessary” that “no
member should have any private advantage or emolument, to get
or to lose, by his being for or against either side of the question.”526
The solicitude that critics of the Contractor’s Act showed to
members of the House of Commons demonstrates that elected
representatives pose a special risk. As another mid-century
518
Id. at §§ 4–6. The act allowed grace periods for members to renounce the
benefits of such contracts. Id.
519
Id. at § 10.
520
Id. at § 3 (incorporated trading companies and other companies with more than
ten members).
521
Id. at §§ 1–2.
522
See id. at § 9 (five hundred pounds per day plus costs). The current value of
five hundred pounds is approximately one hundred thousand dollars. See BANK OF
ENGLAND, Inflation Calculator, https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy/
inflation/inflation-calculator (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) (£500 inflation adjusted from
1782 to 2018 equals £82,895.52); BANK OF ENGLAND, Daily Spot Exchange Rates
Against Sterling, https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/Rates.asp?TD=
17&TM=Oct&TY=2019&into=GBP&rateview=D (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) (spot
exchange rate $1.2062 per £1.00).
523
22 Geo. 3 c. 45, § 9 (1782).
524
See id. at § 10 (five hundred pounds plus costs).
525
See id. at §§ 9–10.
526
MORTIMER, supra note 207, at 316.
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author observed, abuses by monarchs are easily seen, but those by
elected representatives are not; people are generally deluded by
the supposition that their elected representatives will act for the
common good.527
The British proposal had the potential to profoundly affect the
prosecution of the war against the United States. Americans
followed it closely. The press reported the bill’s purpose and
progress.528 John Adams received updates from Europe on its
progress, the effects of a change in the British administration on
the likelihood of enactment, and even the positions of individual
members of the House of Lords on the bill.529 A prominent 1786
history of the war noted the importance of the Contractor’s Act and
the debates on it.530

527

See JOHN SHEBBEARE, A SECOND LETTER TO THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND ON
FOREIGN SUBSIDIES, SUBSIDIARY ARMIES, AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES TO THIS NATION
14–15 (London, J. Scott 1755); cf. id. at 15 (attacking laws that “violate the
Constitution, create Inequality in the Course of distributive Justice, pillage the many
to inrich the few, . . . sacrifice the public Good to private Emoluments, and English
Property to Foreign Interest”). Similarly, opponents of the Alien and Sedition Acts
insinuated in 1798 that Federalists were closeted monarchists “distributing
emolument among devoted partizans . . . and deluding the people with professions of
republicanism.” ELLIOT, supra note 396, at 557.
528
See, e.g., Contractors Bill, ROYAL AMERICAN GAZETTE (New York), July 23,
1782, at 1; Contractors Bill, ROYAL GAZETTE (New York), Aug. 21, 1782, at 1;
Continuation of the Contractors Bill from our Last, ROYAL GAZETTE (New York), Aug.
24, 1782, at 1; The Speech of the Right Hon Charls James Fox, at a General Meeting
of the Electors of Westminster, THE NEW-YORK GAZETTEER, OR, NORTHERN
INTELLIGENCER (Albany, N.Y.), Oct. 28, 1782, at 1.
529
See, e.g., Edmund Jenings, To John Adams from Edmund Jenings, NAT’L
ARCHIVES (Apr. 24, 1780), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-09-020127 (discussing Contractor’s Bill and enclosing newspaper report of the debates in
the House of Lords); Edmund Jenings, To John Adams from Edmund Jenings, NAT’L
ARCHIVES (Mar. 31, 1782), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-12-020233 (discussing likelihood of enactment under new British administration); Edmund
Jenings, To John Adams from Edmund Jenings, NAT’L ARCHIVES (May 16, 1782),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-13-02-0022 (discussing positions
of several members of the House of Lords on the bill).
530
See 3 JOHN ANDREWS, HISTORY OF THE WAR WITH AMERICA, FRANCE, SPAIN,
AND HOLLAND; COMMENCING IN 1775 AND ENDING IN 1783, at 392–94 (London,
John Fielding 1786). For American awareness of Andrews’s work generally, see
François Soulés, To Thomas Jefferson from François Soulés, NAT’L ARCHIVES (Sept.
11, 1786) https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-10-02-0249 (questions
regarding other parts of Andrews’s History), Thomas Jefferson, II. Answers to Soulés’
Queries, NAT’L ARCHIVES (Sept. 13–18, 1786), https://founders.archives.gov/
documents/Jefferson/01-10-02-0257-0003; Abigail Adams, Letter from Abigail Adams
to Mary Smith Cranch, NAT’L ARCHIVES (Sept. 12, 1786), https://founders.archives.
gov/documents/Adams/04-07-02-0127 (advising that she had sent a copy of Andrews’s
History to Cranch).
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Other Americans and British were well aware of the
connection between conflicts of interest and the ravages of war.
An American loyalist was accused in 1779 of lengthening the
Revolutionary war for his own emolument.531
The 1776
532
533
constitutions of Delaware, Maryland, and North Carolina534
forbade military contractors to hold important governmental
positions. A British critic charged members of Parliament around
1780 with betraying the people by making “private contracts for
themselves” like “human pelicans, who feed upon the breast which
nourished them into being . . . . War is produced and encouraged
for the support of private emolument. Thus,—for personal
contracts, social lives and treasures are sacrificed.”535 And in 1792,
Alexander Hamilton noted suspicions of villainous “prostitution
and corruption in office” and “of the horrid depravity of promoting
wars and the shedding of human blood for the sake of sharing
collusively in the emoluments of lucrative contracts.”536
It is profoundly disturbing even to suggest that the Domestic
Emoluments Clause allows the commander in chief to receive the
emoluments of military contracts, honest or not, when prosecuting
wars that shed the blood of armed forces and civilians throughout
the world.
Americans were also well aware of the more general threat
that conflicts of interest from business transactions posed. A
Pennsylvanian advocated legislation in 1787 forbidding the county
treasurer to operate a mercantile business while in office to stop
him from trading with the government and using “public monies
for his own particular emolument . . . like a prostituted judge
sitting arbitrarily in his own cause.”537 He argued that nothing
531

See Letter to the Editor from A.B., ROYAL GAZETTE (New York), Dec. 4, 1779,
at 3 (disputing the claim).
532
See DEL. CONST., art. 18 (1776), reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
SEVERAL INDEPENDENT STATES OF AMERICA 227 (London, 2d ed. 1783) (excluded from
both Houses of Assembly).
533
See MD. CONST., § 37 (1776), reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE SEVERAL
INDEPENDENT STATES OF AMERICA 267 (London, 2d ed. 1783) (excluded from General
Assembly and State Council).
534
See N.C. CONST., art. 27 (1776), reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
SEVERAL INDEPENDENT STATES OF AMERICA 307 (London, 2d ed. 1783) (excluded from
Senate, House of Commons, and Council of State).
535
ANON., supra note 388, at 29.
536
See Alexander Hamilton, The Vindication No. I, NAT’L ARCHIVES (May–Aug.
1792) https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-11-02-0376 (denying
those suspicions in the case of the American government).
537
Manlius, Letter to Messieurs Hall and Sellers, PENNSYLVANIA GAZETTE (June
20, 1787).
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seems more incompatible with our government than to allow the
holder of an office “to subvert and apply it to the abhorrent
purposes of self-interest and private gratification.”538
Two years later, Congress imposed just such a broad
prohibition in the Treasury Act, demonstrating an even more
radical desire to eliminate conflicts of interest from honest
business activities than Parliament’s. The act provided broadly:
That no person appointed to any office instituted by this act, shall
directly or indirectly be concerned or interested in carrying on the
business of trade or commerce, or be owner in whole or in part of
any sea-vessel, or purchase by himself, or another in trust for
him, any public lands or other public property, or be concerned in
the purchase or disposal of any public securities of any State, or
of the United States . . . .539

The statute fined violators the equivalent of approximately
forty-five thousand dollars540 and gave half as a bounty to those
whose information led to a conviction.541 The public provisions and
trading statutes of 1795,542 1796,543 and 1806544 discussed above545
included similar provisions, although they post-date Natelson’s
1790 cutoff. In addition to imposing duties of good faith, these
statutes represent early exercises of the power to prohibit
commerce, including domestic commerce.
A final example from 1808 rounds out the reform movement,
although it also post-dates Natelson’s cutoff. The Congressional
Emoluments Clause does not forbid members of Congress to
benefit from contracts with the federal government. Congress and
President Jefferson remedied that omission in 1808 with “An Act

538

See id.
See An Act to Establish the Treasury Department, ch. 12, § 8, 1 Stat. 65,
67 (1789).
540
See id. (three thousand dollar fine); Morgan Friedman, The Inflation
Calculator, WESTEGG.COM, https://westegg.com/inflation/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2019)
(calculating from 1800 to 2018, the earliest and latest dates available).
541
See An Act to Establish the Treasury Department, ch. 12, § 8, 1 Stat. 65,
67 (1789).
542
See An Act to Establish the Office of Purveyor of Public Supplies, ch. 27, § 2, 2
Stat. 419 (1795).
543
See An Act for Establishing Trading Houses with the Indian Tribes, ch. 13,
§§ 1, 3, 1 Stat. 452 (1796). The interaction of these two sections of the act could be
interpreted only to prohibit trading with the Indian tribes for one’s own account.
544
See An Act for Establishing Trading Houses with the Indian Tribes, ch. 48,
§§ 2, 5, 6, 1 Stat. 402 (1806).
545
See supra notes 405–409 and accompanying text.
539

754

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:683

concerning public contracts” (the “Public Contracts Act”).546 The
main text broadly mirrors that of the British Contractor’s Act. It
provides in part:
That from and after the passage of this act, no member of
Congress shall, directly or indirectly, himself, or by any other
person whatsoever, in trust for him, or for his use or benefit, or
on his account, undertake, execute, hold or enjoy, in the whole or
in part, any contract or agreement hereafter to be made or
entered into with any officer of the United States, in their behalf,
or with any person authorized to make contracts on the part of
the United States . . . .547

The Public Contracts Act was also radical. It voided any
contract that violated its terms.548 It made violations high
misdemeanors for the member of Congress and the federal officer
who made the contract, with a fine equivalent to approximately
forty-five thousand dollars.549
Also similar to the Contractor’s Act, it provides “[t]hat in every
such contract or agreement to be made or entered into, or accepted
as aforesaid, there shall be inserted an express condition that no
member of Congress shall be admitted to any share or part of such
contract or agreement, or to any benefit to arise thereupon.”550
This statute, as amended, remains in force today.551 Thus, one can
draw a direct line from the prohibitions in the Contractor’s Act
through the Emoluments Clauses and the Public Contracts Act to
the provision in the federal lease for the Trump International

546
An Act Concerning Public Contracts, ch. 48, 1 Stat. 484 (1808). For a general
description of the act, its legislative history and continuing impact, see Patricia H.
Wittie, Origins and History of Competition Requirements in Federal Government
Contracting: There’s Nothing New Under the Sun 5–6, REED SMITH,
https://www.reedsmith.com/-/media/files/perspectives/2003/02/origins-and-history-ofcompetition-requirements-in/files/origins-and-history-of-competition-requirementsin/fileattachment/wittiepaper.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2019).
547
An Act Concerning Public Contracts, ch. 48, § 1, 1 Stat. 484 (1808). The act had
two limited exceptions, for certain bills of exchange and for contracts with
corporations that were made for the general benefit of the corporation. See id. at § 2.
548
Id. at § 1.
549
Id. (members of Congress, with a $3,000 fine); id. at § 4 (federal officer, with a
$3,000 fine); Friedman, supra note 540 ($3,000 in 1808 worth approximately
forty-seven thousand dollars in 2018).
550
See An Act Concerning Public Contracts, ch. 48, § 3, 1 Stat. 484 (1808).
551
See 18 U.S.C. § 431 (2018).
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Hotel that no “elected official of the Government . . . shall be
admitted to share any part of this Lease, or any benefit that may
arise therefrom.”552
Unsurprisingly, the debates over the Public Contracts Act
were similar to those over the British Contractor’s Act.
Representative Holland opposed the proposal, “saying it
disfranchised members of Congress of the right of making public
contracts, and enjoying the benefit of them, in common with other
citizens.”553 Representative Rowan considered the proposal to be
“an unconstitutional, needless, and ineffectual restraint on the
liberty of the citizen.”554 Representative Alston invited proponents
to “lay aside their phrenzy in purifying the House,” arguing that
the proposal served no purpose.555 “He wished gentlemen would
give up this parade about purifying the House—this noise about
fraud and corruption.”556
On the other hand, Representative Troup supported the
proposal because “in the event of war, a majority of this House
might be composed of contractors under Executive influence,
whose interest it might be to perpetuate the war, and the evils of
whose conduct might not be corrected without a resort to first
principles.”557 Representative Clay urged enactment, saying that
“he would purge the House of Executive influence by positive law,
otherwise, they might see the time when contracts would be
offered to members to destroy their independence and engage
them in the indiscriminate support of a corrupt Administration.”558
Directly addressing British practice, Representative Troup argued
that if the proposal were not enacted, “the time is not far distant
when this House will become, what the British House of Commons

552

See Jessica Taylor & Peter Overby, Federal Watchdog Finds Government
Ignored Emoluments Clause with Trump Hotel, NPR (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.npr.
org/2019/01/16/685977471/federal-watchdog-finds-government-ignored-emolumentsclause-with-trump-hotel.
553
18 UNITED STATES, THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED STATES 1618 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1852) (debate on Feb. 16, 1808).
554
Id. at 1716.
555
Id. For references to “phrenzy” and “purifying” the House of Commons in the
debates over the Contractor’s Act, see supra notes 485–486 and accompanying text.
556
UNITED STATES, supra note 553, at 1716.
557
Id. For the British enactment of the Contractor’s Act to stop the same practice
during the American war, see supra notes 506–509 and accompanying text.
558
UNITED STATES, supra note 553, at 1717.
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are, a corrupt, servile, dependent, and contemptible body. We had
better have no Legislature, than one composed of contractors,
placemen, and pensioners.”559
Natelson’s work calls to mind the Protestant critique of
religious interpretation. Exposition beyond the text is a process of
human invention that “a discreet Man may do well,” but the result
is “his scripture, not the Holy Ghost’s.”560 There certainly were
period uses of “emoluments” that involved setting the
compensation of officeholders. But period authorities that limited
or prohibited the receipt of emoluments functioned broadly to
reach benefits of business transactions in order to enforce a strong
principle of good faith in the use of public funds and in the exercise
of governmental powers.
Moreover, Natelson may not have consciously used his own
norms to identify and balance the five values, but the result
certainly reflects a political morality weighted toward private
enterprise that is inconsistent with the British and American
reform movements. Whether it is possible to apply a pluralist
method of legal interpretation to determine law as a social fact561
without reference to one’s own norms is questionable. Whether
that
method
would
accurately
describe
founding-era
Anglo-American legal practice is also questionable.
3.

Corpus Linguistics Approaches

Clark D. Cunningham and Jesse Egbert conducted a corpus
linguistics analysis of “emolument” by applying big data
techniques to the nearly one hundred thousand texts in the Corpus
of Founding Era American English (“COFEA”).562 They considered
every text in which “emolument” appeared, analyzed them using
three different methods, and concluded that there was no evidence
that emolument had a narrow meaning limited to profits from an

559

Id. at 1618. For a brief discussion of ministerial influence through placemen
and Parliament’s failed attempt to exclude them by the Act of Settlement, see Foord,
supra note 477, at 497–99.
560
JOHN SELDEN, TABLE-TALK: BEING THE DISCOURSES OF JOHN SELDEN, ESQ.
112 (London, Israel Gollancz M.A. ed., 1689), cited by Powell, supra note 1, at 889–90
(citing 1699 edition).
561
Cf. Sachs, supra note 13, at 833 (“[I]t’s still possible that social facts ultimately
provide the answer, and that this answer supports the originalist view.”).
562
See Cunningham & Egbert, supra note 193, at 1.
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office or employ.563 Rather, “emoluments” was consistently used
with a broad and inclusive meaning that was narrowed as required
in context by modifiers such as “private” or “official.”564
James Cleith Phillips and Sara White conducted another
corpus linguistics analysis using a subset of three of the COFEA
corpora.565
They concluded “that the Congressional and
Presidential Emoluments Clauses would have most likely been
understood to contain a narrow, office or public-employment sense
of ‘emolument.’ But the Foreign Emoluments Clause is more
ambiguous given the modifying language ‘of any kind whatever’
attached to it.”566
Corpus linguistics cannot be scientific if two sets of
researchers come to diametrically opposite conclusions from
analyzing the same three corpora;567 one finding no evidence of the
narrow meaning in any of the Emoluments Clauses, and the other
finding that two of the Clauses most likely have the narrow
meaning and that the third might have it as well. Indeed, both
teams acknowledge that they relied on qualitative analyses.568
Phillips and White further explain that “the heart of corpus
linguistic analysis—what in our view is the aspect of the
methodology that provides the most valuable information—is the
most qualitative and is really no different than reading a sample
of cases one has found from a computerized search of a legal
database.”569 Corpus linguistic analysis of the Constitution is just
ordinary lawyer’s work. It cannot determine a historically

563

See id. at 2.
See id. at 2, 9–14.
565
See James Cleith Phillips & Sara White, The Meaning of the Three
Emoluments Clauses in the U.S. Constitution: A Corpus Linguistic Analysis of
American English From 1760–1799, 59 S. TEX. L. REV. 181, 203 (2017) (examining the
Evans Early American Imprint Series, Founders Online, and Hein Online);
Cunningham & Egbert, supra note 193, at 6 (noting that COFEA consists of six
sources, including Evans, Founders Online, and Hein Online).
566
See Phillips & White, supra note 565, at 233–34.
567
The scientific method requires that different teams can obtain a given
measurement with a given precision using the same experimental setup (replicability)
or a different experimental setup (reproducibility). See Hans E. Plesser,
Reproducibility vs. Replicability: A Brief History of a Confused Terminology,
FRONTIERS IN NEUROINFORMATICS (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.frontiersin.org/
articles/10.3389/fninf.2017.00076/full.
568
See Phillips & White, supra note 565, at 233; Cunningham & Egbert, supra
note 193, at 8.
569
See Phillips & White, supra note 565, at 233.
564
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authentic and objective semantic constitutional meaning
communicated from the past. The two teams’ interpretations are
their own subjective opinions.
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR ORIGINALISM
A.

Implications of Context

The shift from dictionary definitions to broader context and
eighteenth-century corpora only increases the possible meanings
of constitutional text. Context shows multiple inconsistent public
meanings, as corpus linguistics confirms.570 One cannot determine
an original public meaning by any objective factual standard like
counting usage votes, any more than one can do so by counting
dictionary votes or intention votes.
Context might suggest multiple meanings for a single word in
the same constitutional clause, as Barnett asserts of “regulate”
within the Commerce Clause;571 a single meaning for a multiple
word term, as Tillman asserts of “office under” in the Domestic
Emoluments Clause;572 and the same meaning for different words
and different multiple word terms, as Barnett asserts of “trade,”
“commerce,” “trade and commerce,” and “trade or commerce.”573
Context can blunt seemingly comprehensive descriptions of a
term’s reach, as in Hoyt. Context can also explain an absence of
recorded public usage. Things might be so well known that they
do not require any reference in context. Other things might be too
well known even to set out. Samuel Johnson explained that “such
is the fate of hapless lexicography, that not only darkness, but
light, impedes and distresses it; things may be not only too little,
but too much known, to be happily illustrated.”574 Uses are facts
in the world. Constitutional meanings are not. There are multiple
original public meanings of the constitutional terms discussed

570
Cf. Blackman & Phillips, supra note 188 (applying corpus linguistics to the
Second Amendment “leads to potentially uncomfortable criticisms for” prior original
public meaning opinions, although the authors do not reach a conclusion on the result
corpus linguistics might generate).
571
See supra notes 267–272 and accompanying text.
572
See supra note 309 and accompanying text.
573
See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
574
JOHNSON, supra note 173 (fifth preface page).
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above, and none can emerge objectively from the corpus
of eighteenth-century usage as a factual, communicated
constitutional meaning.575
This is particularly true when context includes competing
principles of political morality. Where interpretation depends on
identifying and balancing underlying constitutional principles and
characterizing some duties as fundamental, meaning cannot exist
as a historical fact. Where context includes (1) the deal one thinks
that the drafters and ratifiers struck, and (2) a judgment about
which duties are actually fundamental, there cannot be a
non-normative original public meaning of constitutional text. The
interpreter must choose. As Benjamin Franklin recognized,
“[s]uch is the imperfection of our language, and perhaps of all
other languages, that, notwithstanding we are furnished with
dictionaries innumerable, we cannot precisely know the import of
words, unless we know of what party the man is that uses them.”576
By choosing and balancing underlying principles and fundamental
duties, the interpreter determines of what party the Constitution
is and thereby what it means.
B. Pre-interpretive Commitments
Tillman includes general British law as relevant context for
interpreting the Constitution. Natelson goes further and includes
specific British statutes as relevant. The Constitution is not an
independent charter,577 but rather part of a long Anglo-American
legal tradition. This is a normative pre-interpretive assumption.
The Supreme Court has held that known legal terms used in the
Constitution take their common law meanings,578 but that rule
is not in the Constitution. It is a post-ratification interpretation
that originalists can dispute like any other Supreme Court
interpretation.579

575

Cf. Lawrence M. Solan, Can Corpus Linguistics Help Make Originalism
Scientific?, 126 YALE L.J. F. 57, 57 (May 27, 2016).
576
FRANKLIN, supra note 143, at 318.
577
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law
of the Land”).
578
See, e.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 167–68 (1874); United
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 654 (1898).
579
See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 13, at 137 (disputing early Supreme Court
interpretation of reach of “commerce”).
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Moreover, Tillman’s and Natelson’s approaches require
taking a pre-interpretive position on the extent of America’s
separation from Britain.580 Was the American Revolution truly a
revolution, or merely a continuation of the English and British
systems except as specifically changed by express constitutional
terms? Did Americans rebel to create a new government, or
merely separate in order to guarantee the rights of English that
they believed they deserved, including the right not to pay taxes
without representation? How are we to determine whether to rely
on general American usage for words like “office” and “under”
rather than British legal usage? Should we use legal or ordinary
dictionaries? Which usage governs when words like “emoluments”
exist in the popular as well as legal press, particularly where the
same variety of usage appears in both?
Is the analogy to British law relevant where the U.S. system
differs from the British system? The Constitution uses the English
legal term “natural born,” for example, and some deny that the
constitutional definition mirrors the English one because the
United States threw off a monarchical government and
established a different, republican form of government.581 Britain
did not have a separately elected executive branch. Might this
make British law irrelevant to executive offices described in the
Constitution? Ellesmere rejected reliance on Plato and Aristotle
in judging Calvin’s Case because they lived in a popular state and
were enemies of monarchies.582 Consequently, their opinions “are
no canons to give lawes to kinges and kingdomes, no more than sir
Thomas Moores Vtopia, or such pamphlets as wee haue at euerie

580
See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, Beyond the Text: Justice Scalia’s Originalism in
Practice, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1952 et seq. (2017); id. at 1957 (“His reliance
[on background English law] . . . assumes a linguistic and conceptual continuity
between the framing and the English-law background (something not obvious in a
revolutionary context).”). Natelson’s position reflects significant historical research.
See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson, The Founders’ Hermeneutic: The Real Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1239, 1246–49 (2007).
581
See, e.g., United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 709 (1898) (Fuller,
C.J., dissenting) (“Manifestly, when the sovereignty of the crown was thrown off, and
an independent government established, every rule of the common law, and every
statute of England obtaining in the Colonies, in derogation of the principles on which
the new government was founded, was abrogated.”); Thomas H. Lee, "Natural Born
Citizen”, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 327, 389–92 (2017) (definition of "natural born Citizen" is
a combination of English law and natural law in part because of the change from a
monarchical to a republican form of government).
582
ELLESMERE, supra note 48, at 692.
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marte.”583 Should canons of English or British monarchical
government provide any more meaning to the Constitution than
Moore’s Utopia?
If the use of “office under” imports the British meaning of the
term, does it also import the same roles, powers, and obligations
of British offices? If usage in the Contractor’s Act exports a
meaning of “emoluments,” does it also export substantive
provisions such as private rights of action? Does it export an
exception for indirect benefits of government contracts received in
limited cases through investments in private companies? Or does
the Foreign Emoluments Clause’s prohibition of emoluments “of
any kind whatever” and the Domestic Emoluments Clause’s
prohibition of “any other” emoluments block the importation of
that exception?
These are only a few of the pre- or meta-interpretive choices
that ground constitutional interpretation and undermine
communicative originalism’s claim to non-normative historical
authenticity. Others include: (1) whether the Constitution created
a federal government of the people or a compact among several
sovereign states;584 (2) whether the enumerated congressional
powers are exclusive or can be supplemented;585 (3) whether the
scope of “commerce” is limited to a specific meaning or structurally
empowers Congress to create solutions to national problems that
the states do not address;586 (4) what are the scopes and relative
priorities of legislative and executive powers;587 (5) what is the
scope and constitutionality of judicial review;588 (6) what principles
underlie the Constitution, and which of those are top-tier;589
(7) which obligations of citizenship are fundamental;590 and
(8) how to resolve doubtful cases.591
583

Id.
See D. A. Jeremy Telman, All That Is Liquidated Melts Into Air: Five MetaInterpretive Issues, 24 BARRY L. REV. 1, 5 (2019).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
588
Id.
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See, e.g., Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
341, 342 (2009).
590
See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
591
See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 487–88 (2013) (strict construction, deference to political
branches, purposive construction, and structural construction); James Madison, From
James Madison to Edward Coles, NAT’L ARCHIVES (May 23, 1823), https://founders.
archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-03-02-0055 (“I am no friend to forced or strained
constructions of a Constitution for enlarging power . . . . But where the object is
584
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C. Essentialism Versus Conventionalism
Originalists face the same recurring conflict between
essentialist and conventionalist approaches to linguistic meaning
as Renaissance jurists. Both approaches are problematic for legal
interpretation.592 One holds that words “contain in some sense the
essence of what they designate,” possessing a “communicative
function” that causes people “to attribute substantiae to them.”593
This presumes a scientific certainty for the meanings of words that
is both dangerous for legal interpretation and inconsistent with
actual legal practice.594 The other approach holds that words’
meanings are entirely conventional, which “threatens to unhitch
[words] from their attachments to the real world, and puts in
jeopardy . . . the possibility of acceding to proprietas verborum
[propriety of words].”595
Was insurance “commerce” in the eighteenth century because
authors called it commerce? Or did authors call insurance
commerce because it was commerce? If the first author to call
insurance “commerce” happened to write in the nineteenth
century, would we conclude that insurance became commerce
then, so that the Commerce Clause does not reach it? Or would
we conclude that insurance actually was commerce all along, so
that Congress’s power reaches it?
Many would conclude the latter. One eighteenth-century
author, for example, explained insurance not to change its
definition, but rather to cast new light on the subject; he dedicated
the work to a prominent authority to appeal to his judgment of
what “the science of insurance” actually was, not to ask for the
arbitrary imposition of the author’s views on the nation:
Your superior Skill in the Commerce of your Country, fixes every
Essay of this sort under your Dominion.—For though your high
Station gives you a Power, you derive from your Abilities an
Authority much greater, over these Subjects. A Work, therefore,
which pretends to bring new Light upon Objects of Trade, and to
rectify the Course of Business, is justly to pay its Homage to You;
And it is from your Decision upon it, that the World will be

indisputably, the public Good, and certainly within the policy of the Constitutional
provision, a less strict rule of interpretation must be admitted.”).
592
MACLEAN, supra note 89, at 110–11.
593
Id.
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See, e.g., id. at 107-09.
595
Id. at 111.
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instructed to form their Sentiments.—For so just is the public
Deference, that it would unanimously have constituted YOU the
Judge, if you had not condescended to be the Patron . . . .596

One can conclude that the Emoluments Clauses reach
honest contracts with governments without having to rely on
essentialism, conventionalism, proper definitions from the
founding era, or definitions by designation of a myriad of
founding-era uses. Even if the Contractor’s Act and debates
surrounding it occurred after the adoption of the Constitution, an
interpreter could reasonably conclude that the Clauses reach
honest business transactions with government. As Aquinas
counsels, we must determine the meaning to which words are put.
The Emoluments Clauses forbid “emoluments” under a public
trust principle that is strong enough to reach those transactions
and to outweigh the top-tier value of decentralization/federalism.
As many point out, for “concepts such as ‘abridging the
freedom of speech,’ which we are likely to encounter in the
constitutional context, it is unclear whether the original meaning
ought to be interpreted thickly to include specific examples of the
concept or thinly to define only the concept itself.”597 This is as
true of superficially non-normative concepts like commerce and
emoluments as of normative concepts like freedom of speech, equal
protection, and due process. Originalists might specify their
choice of breadth of relevant context, fundamental principles,
deals that they believe were struck, and the like. But these choices
are arbitrary and anachronistic, imposed upon the text and public
usage by the interpreter. They cannot determine a non-normative
historical fact about the communicated meaning of the text
from which even prima facie constitutional rights or obligations
can derive.
D. Burden of Proof and Default Rules
Some argue that one can determine the original public
meaning of constitutional text by setting an appropriately low
burden of proof598 and stipulating default interpretive rules to
constrain judicial discretion when founding-era evidence does not

596

MORRIS CORBYN, AN ESSAY TOWARDS ILLUSTRATING THE SCIENCE OF
INSURANCE iv (London, 1747).
597
See, e.g., Solan, supra note 575, at 57.
598
See, e.g., Lawson & Seidman, supra note 29, at 54 n.23 (the only normative
element of legal interpretation is “the standard of proof that one employs”).
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meet that threshold.599 But one cannot find something that does
not exist by lowering the burden of proof, and adopting any default
interpretive rule is a normative decision. One could stipulate a
method of interpretation that references historical sources, such
as stipulating that meaning is determined word-by-word, without
combining any words into phrases, with each word’s meaning
taken from the greatest number of consistent dictionary
definitions found in print in 1789. That would yield a historically
restricted interpretation, but it would not determine as a matter
of fact the original public meaning of the Constitution’s text, nor
would it identify even prima facie normative constitutional rights
and obligations. Stipulated definitions, whatever they are, or the
burden of proof, or default rules used to determine their results,
are not original public meanings communicated to us from the
past. They are merely stipulations. A stipulated method might
function to restrict judicial discretion—although it might not—but
that is a normative objective that must be justified independently
of any historical facts.
CONCLUSION
Originalism is a family of legal theories that share a core focus
on history and an aversion to allowing judges the discretion to
apply contemporary or personal values when interpreting the
Constitution. American originalism first asked what the founders,
drafters, or ratifiers intended. In the face of criticism, it evolved
to ask how the American public understood the Constitution’s
words. This Article shows that public understandings of terms in
the Commerce Clause were broad, reaching commercial activities
like insurance, agriculture and manufacturing, and both
prohibiting and commanding those activities. It also shows that
public understandings of terms in the Emoluments Clauses
reached elected officials and the benefits of business transactions
with governments. Anglo-American legal history proximate to the
adoption of the Constitution is consistent with a broad
interpretation of the Emoluments Clauses to prevent conflicts of
interest, ensure the independence of elected officials, and secure
the survival of representative government.

599
See, e.g., Tillman, supra note 312, at 54–55 (describing without subscribing to
the approach).
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The originalist interpretations of the Commerce and
Emoluments Clauses discussed above do not identify
non-normative, historically accurate communicated meanings
from the past to the contemporary interpreter. They ultimately
rely on normative judgments.
Communicative originalism
continues to face the same challenges that Renaissance civil
lawyers and the English novelists faced.
In light of continuing criticism, originalism is evolving yet
again to ask what we should make of the Constitution by applying
traditional methods of legal analysis to constitutional text, history,
and political morality. The latest evolution of originalism
forthrightly embraces legal methodology as the correct way to
interpret the Constitution. Whether this iteration will be any
more successful than its predecessors remains to be seen. If it is
not, then another will likely take its place. Originalism is
ultimately a normative aspiration embraced by many who hope,
like Fichard, that Emperor Justinian’s ideal of a self-sufficient and
historically-determined legal system will yet come to pass.

